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42 U.S.C. § 1983 MUNICIPAL LIABILITY:
THE MONELL SKETCH BECOMES A
DISTORTED PICTURE
SUSANAH M. MEADt

The forty-second United States Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, now codified at Title 42, section 1983 of the United States
Code. Section 1983 provides broad remedies for persons deprived of
their constitutionalrights "under color of state law." The United States
Supreme Court consistently has been divided in its approachtoward section 1983. This division has resulted in uneven enforcement of the statute and uncertainty about governmental accountabilityfor invasions of
civil rights.
Confusion over the interpretationofsection 1983 has been most apparent in the area of section 1983 municipal liability. The Court has
gone from holding that section 1983 'persons" do not include municipalities to holding the exact opposite. Although holding that section
1983 'persons" do include municipalities, the Court rejected a respondeat superior theory of causation and held that municipalitiescould be
liable only if the deprivation of constitutional rights was caused by a
municipal employee carrying out a governmental policy or custom.
In this Article Professor Mead traces the confusing history of municipal liability under section 1983, including the Supreme Court's rejection of respondeat superior. ProfessorMead argues that the Court's
rejection of respondeat superior in favor of a policy or custom causation
requirement has erected a significant barrierto section 1983 municipal
liability. She suggests that the Supreme Court's acceptance of respondeat superior would more fully carry out the broad vision of civil rights
protection envisioned by the forty-second Congress. ProfessorMead argues that, at the very least, the Court should not interpret the policy or
custom causationrequirementin a way that would undermine the broad
remedialpurpose of section 1983.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The ratification of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments' to
i" Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. B.A. 1969, Smith College;
J.D. 1976, Indiana University School of Law. I wish to express my gratitude to my colleague Professor Lawrence Wilkins for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. The amendments read, in relevant part: "'Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONSr. amend. XIII, § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
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the United States Constitution in the aftermath of the Civil War2 revealed a

national vision that the Constitution guarantee the personal liberties of all citizens. In the Civil Rights Act of 18713 the forty-second Congress of the United
States created the tools necessary to transform that vision into a concrete embodiment of civil rights protection. Section 1 of the Act, now codified at United

States Code Title 42, section 1983, provides federal remedies of tremendous
scope, granting equitable and monetary relief against "[e]very person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution. ... -4 The particular focus of section 1
was the abuse, especially against blacks, perpetrated by state government representatives under discriminatory laws extant in many southern states5 and the

failure of southern law officials to enforce existing laws against the Ku Klux
Klan. 6 An examination of the extensive debates at the time of section l's enactment, however, indicates that Congress intended it to reach beyond the immediate crisis situation in the South and to extend its broad remedies to all persons
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
2. The thirteenth amendment abolishing slavery was ratified in 1865. The fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments were ratified in 1868 and 1870 respectively.
3. ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
4. Id. at 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
5. After the Civil War, southern states passed "Black Codes" limiting the rights of freedom.
See P. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH 51, 215 (1975). But see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 173 (1961) (Justice Douglas noting that although § 1983 might override discriminatory state
laws, at least one opponent of § 1983 considered that purpose to be irrelevant because no such laws
existed), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
6. Established in 1866 in Tennessee by former members of the Confederate Army, the Ku
Klux Klan became a terrifying source of organized violence in the post-bellum South. Often acting
with the support of-or in spite of-local governments, the Klan gained tremendous power.
Although it focused its violence primarily on blacks to prevent them from gaining political or economic equality, it also visited its unspeakable atrocities on whites whose sympathies were with the
North. In response to the growing violence, President Grant sent this message to Congress:
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union rendering life and property
insecure and the carrying of the mails and the collection of the revenue dangerous. The
proof that such a condition of affairs exists in some localities is now before the Senate.
That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not
doubt; that the power of the Executive of the United States, acting within the limits of
existing laws, is sufficient for present emergencies is not clear. Therefore, I urgently recommend such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty,
and property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United States.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871) [hereinafter GLOBE].
The legislation was introduced "[t]o enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States." GLOBE, supra, at XXIII (H.R. 320, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871)).
It was hotly debated in both House and Senate but ultimately was enacted. Civil Rights Act of 1871,
ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
For information on the Ku Klux Klan era and the events leading to passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, see C. BOWERS, THE TRAGIC ERA-THi- REVOLUTION AFrER LINCOLN 306-12
(1929); M. Coul TuR, THE SOUTH DURING RECONSTRUCTION 165-71 (1947); J. RANDALL & D.
DONALD, THE CIVIl. WAR AND RiECONSTRUCTION 682-84 (2d ed. 1961).
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7
deprived of federally protected rights under color of state law.
Despite Congress' expansive intent and the breadth of the language used in
section 1983, the section has had a history of uneven enforcement. Since the
enactment of section 1983, the United States Supreme Court has demonstrated
an irresolute attitude toward the section and its remedies. This attitude has resulted in the emergence of a blurred picture of governmental accountability for
invasions of civil rights. In fact, nearly a century passed before the Court began
to approach section 1983 in a way that revealed the breadth of protection Congress had intended. 8 However, despite the monumental decision of Monroe v.
Pape,9 which made section 1983 remedies widely available against individual
government actors, confusion and inconsistency has continued to mark the
Court's treatment of the statute. This confusion appears in both the methods
used and the results reached in cases construing the statute. The Court consistently has glossed trends toward expansive interpretations resulting in enlargement of section 1983 protection 0 with restrictive readings that narrow its
scope. 1I In addition, the rationales offered to justify the results reached often

7. Representative Shellabarger of Ohio, who introduced the Act in Congress, explained that
§ I (now § 1983)
not only provides a civil remedy for persons whose former condition may have been that of
slaves, but also to all people where, under color of State law, they or any of them may be
deprived of rights to which they are entitled under the Constitution by reason and virtue of
their national citizenship.
GLOBE, supra note 6, app. at 68.
8. The Reconstruction era marked a shift from the antebellum focus on state autonomy to an
emphasis on nationalism. However, courts remained hesitant to expand the powers of the federal
government. Reconstruction legislation therefore was approached cautiously. Thus, despite the
breadth of the language used in § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, early interpretations narrowed
its scope. For example, the Supreme Court determined early that unauthorized conduct of state
officers was not "state action." See, eg., Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430, 438-41 (1904).
In addition, in the Slaughier-House Cases the Supreme Court interpreted the "rights, privileges and
immunities" clause in the fourteenth amendment to include only rights correlative to the existence of
national government. See Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and
Slaughter-House Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). This holding effectively eliminated most civil
rights from the purview of the fourteenth amendment. Because the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was
created to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, this conclusion severely limited the
Act's reach. For discussions of the early case law interpreting the Act, see Shapo, Constitutional
Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the FrontiersBeyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277 (1965); Note, Section 1983
And Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1156-59 (1977).
9. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658 (1978).
10. The prime example is, of course, Monroe, in which the Court reinvigorated the statute by
concluding that abusive behavior of government officers is still under color of state law. See infra
notes 33-41 and accompanying text. Other examples include the municipal immunity holding in
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), discussed infra notes 79-98 and accompanying text; the immunity holding in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980),
discussed infra notes 197-229 and accompanying text; the interpretation of the phrase "and laws"
and construction of the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976 in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1, 11 (1980); and the interpretation of "official policy" in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S.
Ct. 1292, 1298 (1986), discussed infra notes 285-308 and accompanying text.
11. Examples of the Court's restrictive approach to § 1983 include its municipal liability holding in Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191-92, discussed infra notes 42-78 and accompanying text; its conclusion
that municipalities cannot be liable based on respondeatsuperior,Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, discussed
ilifra notes 94-98 and accompanying text; its limitations on damages, see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); its conclusion that municipalities are immune from
the payment of punitive damages, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.. 453 U.S. 247 (1981),
discussed infra notes 231-46 and accompanying text; and its limitations on what kinds of interests
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have varied unpredictably. The Court generally has treated section 1983 cases
as problems of statutory construction, 12 but the techniques for determining the
section's content have been far from consistent. For example, the Court some-

times has looked to the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act, the language
of the statute, and the background of tort liability; at other times the Court has
fallen back on statements of policy. 13 The Court in some cases has focused on a

single consideration; 1 4 in others it has relied on more than one consideration in
diverse combinations.15 The use of these various decisionmaking criteria has
created random blots on the canvas of constitutional tort liability. No recurring
pattern or overall design is discernible. Thus, it is difficult to predict the Court's

probable approach to a section 1983 issue.
In large part, this use of different criteria in approaching section 1983 cases
has been the result of a deep disagreement among members of the Court about
the proper approach to and the scope of the statute. 16 It is a rare section 1983
case that does not contain multiple opinions. 17 The Court's expansive attitude

toward the statute that facilitated the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s has
given way to a far more restrictive approach to the protection of civil liberties in

the 1970s. 18 Clearly, the change in the membership of the Supreme Court partly
accounts for this restrictive trend.19 In addition, courts and commentators have
are constitutionally protected, see Daniels v. Williams 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part, Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986); Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
12. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); Owen v. City of.
Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S
547 (1967); Monroe, 365 U.S. 167.
13. A discussion of how to determine legislative intent properly is well beyond the scope of this
Article. Schools of thought differ on the relevancy of legislative history in determining legislative
intent and whether or when a court should resort to factors outside the statutory language itself.
This Article focuses on the Court's various approaches to determining legislative intent primarily to
illustrate the confusion this inconsistency can cause. For a general discussion of statutory interpretation, see C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (4th ed. 1985).
14. See, e.g., Monroe, 365 U.S. 167 (focus only on legislative history).
15. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (focus on legislative history,
background of tort law, and policy); Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
(focus on legislative history and statutory language).
16. Currently the chief opponents on § 1983 issues are Chief Justice Rehnquist, who often
speaks for the majority in cases restricting the statute, see, eg., Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662
(1986); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981),
overruled in part, Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 667 (1986), and Justice Brennan, who frequently
speaks for the majority in cases expanding the scope of the statute, see, e.g., Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
17. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J., in dissent); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 722 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 175, 178, 188 (1970) (Black, J., concurring; Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part; Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); McNeese v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 676 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
18. For discussions of the contrast, see Morrison, Rights Without Remedies: The Burger Court
Takes the Federal Courts Out ofthe Business of ProtectingFederalRights, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 841
(1977); Neuborne, The ProceduralAssault on the Warren Legacy: A Study ofRepeal by Indirection,
5 HoisrA L. RIsv. 545 (1977).
19. The activism of the Warren Court has given way to a far more restrictive approach. The
Nixon and Reagan appointees have demonstrated a strong desire to reverse the trend established in
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voiced concern over the direction of section 1983 litigation. 20 Since the Court's
decision in Monroe, the number of section 1983 cases has increased dramatically. 2 1 Courts and scholars alike have perceived that the federal courts are
overwhelmed by section 1983 cases, many of which trivialize the concept of constitutional protection that the statute provides.2 2 Furthermore, the proliferation
of cases has brought to a head the already existing fear that the section 1983
action has a negative impact on federalism. 2 3 Despite these concerns there is
still strong sentiment among some members of the Court that section 1983
should be construed to provide the broad scope of protection Congress intended. 24 Unfortunately, the natural result of the tension on the Court with
respect to section 1983 has been to create an indistinct image of the section 1983
action.

Nowhere has the Supreme Court's persistent inability to present a clear
picture of the section 1983 action appeared more starkly than on the issue of

section 1983 municipal liability. The Court has done a complete about-face on
the question whether municipalities can be sued under section 1983. In the
landmark Monroe decision the Court concluded that Congress did not intend
municipalities to be section 1983 "person[s]. '' 25 However, the Court overruled
the Warren era of using the federal courts to protect federal rights. See, eg., Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 375, 376 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting, and Powell, J., dissenting).
20. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981), overruled in part, Daniels v. Williams,
106 S. Ct. 662 (1986); Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's
Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORD. 557, 574-82;
McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on JudicialEnforcement of Constitutional
Protections (pt. 1), 60 VA. L. REV.1 (1974); Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort
Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974); Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447 (1978); Shapo, supra
note 8; Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5 (1980).
21. In Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), Justice Powell noted in his dissent the
significant increase in § 1983 suits brought by state prisoners. Id. at 534 (Powell, J., dissenting). In
1961, the year Monroe was decided, only 270 civil rights cases were filed in federal district courts.
Id. at 533 (Powell, J., dissenting). In 1981 over 30,000 civil rights cases were filed. Id.
22. Cases causing the greatest concern have been the prisoner property deprivation cases that
have proliferated in the past two decades. Cases have been filed in federal court claiming constitutional injury for a lost hobby kit worth $22.50, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in
part, Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986); confiscated cigarettes, Weddle v. Director, Patuxent
Inst., 436 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1970); and for confiscated tennis shoes, Almond v. Kent, 321 F. Supp.
1225 (W.D. Va. 1970). For a discussion of prisoner property deprivation and § 1983, see Note,
PrisonerProperty Deprivations: Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 IND. L.J. 257
(1976). These cases do indeed seem trivial when compared to the civil rights cases of the 1960s in
which § 1983 was used in the fight for racial equality. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
23. Federalism has been described as
a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that
will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). That the balance between the power of the states and the
power of the federal government might be upset by § 1983 has been a matter of legitimate concern.
See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 535-36 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); Monroe, 365 U.S.
at 237-40 (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting); Aldisert, supra note 20, at 562-63; McCormack, supra note
20, at Ipassim.
24. See, e.g., City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834-44 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (if doctrine of respondeat superiorwould impose liability on a city in a normal tort action for
police misconduct, the doctrine should apply in a § 1983 case).
25. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191.
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the Monroe municipal liability holding in Monell v. Department of Social Services 26 and found that Congress had intended municipalities to be "person[s]"
within the meaning of section 1983.27 Having determined that municipalities
could be sued under section 1983, the Court had to decide how to impose liability on a party that was not the one whose acts brought about the constitutional
deprivation. 28 In Monell the majority concluded that municipalities may not be
29
held liable for the torts of their employees based on respondeat superior.
Rather, municipalities may be held liable only "when execution of a government's policy or custom .

.

. inflicts the injury. ' 30 Although the majority in

Monell purported "only to sketch ... the section 1983 cause of action against a
local government" and specifically left further refinements of the action "to another day,"'' 3 its gratuitous introduction of the "policy or custom" causation
requirement 32 created an error in perspective. This perspective, in turn, has set
up a significant barrier to the development of a clear understanding of section
1983 municipal liability. The Court's recent attempts to give substance to the
Monell section 1983 municipal liability sketch amply illustrate that the distortion produced by the policy or custom causation requirement, together with the
mixed criteria used in section 1983 cases, have resulted in a picture of section
1983 municipal liability so blurred that the lower courts will continue to be confused and confounded.
This Article examines the section 1983 municipal liability "sketch" drawn
in Monell and the recent additions the Court has made to it to demonstrate the
difficulties created by the Court's rejection of respondeatsuperior in favor of the
policy or custom causation requirement. Part II examines the background of
section 1983 municipal liability from the Supreme Court's rejection of it in
Monroe to its reconsideration of that issue in Monell. In addition, part II focuses on the Court's interpretation of the legislative history in Monroe to reject
section 1983 municipal liability, its reinterpretation of that same history in Monell, and its use of the history to conclude that municipal liability cannot be
based on a theory of respondeat superior. Part III examines the rejection of respondeatsuperiorand concludes that the Court erred in rejecting that concept in
26. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
27. Id. at 688-89.
28. Although the Court had not dealt with a § 1983 municipal defendant before Monell, it had
considered the problem of third party liability in a § 1983 context. In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976), the Court considered the liability of supervisory personnel for the constitutional violations of
frontline employees. In Rizzo the Court held that equitable reliefcould not be granted against supervisory personnel if no affirmative link existed between any plan or policy of defendants and the
occurrences of police misconduct. Id. at 371. The Court found the only causal connection between
defendants and the injury was the absence of a change in police procedure that led to the continuation of the claimed lack of training and supervision. Id.
29. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

30. Id. at 694.
31. !d. at 695.
32. Monell involved a formal municipal policy that the Court found clearly unconstitutional.
Id. at 694-95. There was no unconstitutional behavior of a municipal employee alleged that might
have raised the issue of the basis of municipal liability. Therefore, the Court's conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be liable based on respondeatsuperiorwas not essential to the
holding and was dictum. See id. at 714 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
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favor of the policy or custom causation requirement. Part IV analyzes the
Supreme Court's recent attempts to clarify the picture of municipal liability
sketched in Monell. In particular, part IV looks to the Court's approach to
municipal immunity. Part IV also examines the requirement that a party must
establish that a governmental policy or custom has inflicted a section 1983 harm
and concludes that lower federal courts and the Supreme Court itself have misunderstood this requirement. The Article concludes that the Court's erroneous
decision in Monell to exclude respondeatsuperioras a basis for imposing liability
on municipalities distorted the picture of section 1983 municipal liability. This
distortion in perspective also may threaten the overall section 1983 picture. This
Article suggests that the Court should reconsider its rejection of respondeatsuperior. At the very least, the Court should take great care that the policy or
custom requirement not be interpreted in a way that subverts the expansive intent of Congress to provide remedies of great scope in section 1983 for the protection of personal freedom.
II.

SECTION 1983

M[UNICIPAL LIABILITY FROM MONROE TO MONELL-A

DISTORTED SKETCH ON A BLANK CANVAS

A.

Monroe v. Pape-A Misinterpretationof CongressionalIntent

The starting point for any discussion of section 1983 municipal liability
must be the Supreme Court's decision to reject such liability in Monroe v.
Pape.33 Plaintiffs in Monroe, members of a black family, were victimized by
Chicago police officers who broke into their home without a warrant in the middle of the night, made them stand naked while their house was searched, and
took the father to the police station where he was held incommunicado for many
hours. Plaintiffs sued the city of Chicago and the police officers involved claiming violations of their constitutional rights. 34 The case presented the Court with
an opportunity to settle several recurring questions that long had impeded the
application of section 1983. After extensive investigation of the statute's legislative history, the Court held that actions taken by government officials in excess
of their authority still are taken under color of state law35 and that the federal
remedy provided by section 1983 "is supplementary to the state remedy, and the
latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."' 36
Furthermore, the Court addressed the state of mind issue and set the stage for its
ultimate conclusion that a section 1983 prima facie case requires only a showing
that action taken under color of state law caused a constitutional violation. 37
33. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191-92.
34. Id. at 169.
35. Id. at 184, 187.
36. Id. at 183.
37. Id. at 187. In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part,Daniels v. Williams,
106 S. Ct. 662 (1986), the Court addressed whether mere negligence would support a claim for relief
under § 1983. It stated unequivocally that the two elements of a § 1983 claim are: "(1) whether the
conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether
this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States." Id. at 535. Thus, the action contains no state of mind or culpability
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Finally, the Court instructed that section 1983 should "be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural conse-

quences of his actions."'38 Although this admonition has been the subject of
much debate, 39 it is a directive that has helped establish the concept of "constitutional tort" 40 and has guided the Court on many occasions in interpreting
section 1983.41 By settling these major issues the Court made great strides toward realizing the statute's tremendous potential for providing redress to persons deprived of individual liberties at the hands of government officials.
Unfortunately, despite the steps the Court took in Monroe to restore to its

intended brilliance the Congressional vision of protecting civil liberties and individual rights, the Court seriously impaired the full development of the section
1983 picture by rejecting a remedy against municipalities for invasions of civil
rights. 42 The Monroe Court found that Congress' rejection of the Sherman
Amendment 43 indicated Congressional intent to exclude municipalities from the

meaning of "person" as used in section 1983. 44 The Sherman Amendment
would have imposed municipal liability for acts of violence perpetrated within
'45
the municipality by citizens "riotously and tumultuously assembled together."
Looking to the Congressional debates accompanying consideration of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, the Court noted that one reason advanced against the adoption of the Sherman Amendment was doubt about the constitutional power of
requirement. The Court reiterated this position in Daniels v. Williams, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664 (1986)
(holding, however, that due process is not violated by a negligent act causing injury). For discussions of the state of mind requirement in § 1983, see Kirkpatrick, Defining a Constitutional Tort
Under Section 1983: The State of Mind Requirement, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 45 (1977); Mead, Evolution of the "Species of Tort Liability" Created by 42 USC § 1983: Can ConstitutionalTort Be Saved
From Extinction?,55 FORDHAM L. REV. 301 (1986); Nahmod, ConstitutionalAccountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 68 IowA L. REv. 1 (1982); Comment, The Evolution of the State of Mind
Requirement of Section 1983, 47 TUL. L. REV. 870 (1973); Note, supra note 8, at 1204-07 (1977);
Note, Basis ofLiability in a Section 1983 Suit: When is the State-of-Mind Analysis Relevant?, 57 IND.
L.J. 459 (1982); Note, A Theory of Negligence for Constitutional Torts, 92 YALE L.J. 683 (1983).
38. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
39. See, eg., Kirkpatrick, supra note 37, at 45 passim; Nahmod, supra note 20, at 5 passim.
40. "Constitutional tort" has become the descriptive term used to characterize the kind of conduct that gives rise to liability under § 1983. It was coined by Professor Marshall Shapo in his
article, ConstitutionalTort: Monroe v. Pape and the FrontiersBeyond. See Shapo, supra note 8, at
323-24.
41, It is not clear what circumstances in a § 1983 case prompt the Supreme Court to look to the
background of tort liability. However, it appears the Court is especially apt to look to the background of tort liability when it finds no guidance in the statute itself. For example, the Court has
examined existing tort principles in the area of immunities. See, e.g.,
Owen v.City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (no tradition of immunity for municipal corporations); Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 242 (1974) (the concept of qualified immunity for government officials assumes officials
may err, but it is better to risk some error than not to act at all); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554
(1967) (common-law immunity ofjudges allows for decisions based on reasoning rather than fear of
charged corruptions). The Court also has looked to the background of tort law to determine
whether municipalities should be immune from punitive damages. See City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
42. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187. The plaintiffs in Monroe had sued not only the individual police
officers responsible for the atrocities, but also the city of Chicago.
43. See infra note 53.
44. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191.
45. GLOBE, supra note 6, at 663.
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46
Congress to impose civil liability on municipal corporations. From the negative reactions to municipal liability expressed in these debates, the Court inferred
that Congress could not have intended the word "person" in section 1983 to
include municipalities. The Court's conclusion was unaffected by the fact Congress, only months before passage of the Civil Rights legislation, had passed a set
of definitions to aid statutory construction which stated that the word person
"may extend... to bodies politic and corporate." 47 The Court justified its ex-

clusion of municipalities from the meaning of "person" by noting that "this defi-

nition is merely an allowable, not a mandatory one" 48 and that the rejection of

the Sherman Amendment indicated such an antagonistic view of municipal liability in this context that Congress could not have intended the word "person"
to include municipalities. 4 9
Although certain aspects of the Monroe decision were praised as advancing
the cause of personal liberty,50 the rejection of municipal liability was soundly

criticized.5 1 Scholars argued that the Court's reliance on legislative history was
misplaced. 52 The Sherman Amendment would have imposed municipal liability
for acts of ordinary citizens against other citizens.5 3 Thus, it was not directed to
the problem of abuse of governmental power addressed in section 1983. Rather,
46. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190.
47. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431,431 (repealed 1939). This Act was titled "An
Act Prescribing the Form of the Enacting and Resolving Clauses of Acts and Resolutions of Congress, and Rules for the Construction thereof." Id. at 431.
48. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Shapo, supra note 8, at 294-96; Whitman, supra note 20, at 12-14.
51. See, e.g., Hundt, Suing MunicipalitiesDirectly Under the FourteenthAmendment, 70 Nw.
U.L. REy. 770 (1975); Kates & Kouba, Liability of PublicEntities Under Section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 131 (1972); Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1201, 1203-09 (1971); see also Comment, Municipal Liabilityfor
Constitutional Violations: Can You Fight City Hall? A Survey of the Circuits,16 DUQ. L. REv. 373,
374 (1977-78) (noting such criticism).
52. See, e.g., Kates & Kouba, supra note 51, at 132-36; Comment, supranote 51, at 374; Note,
supra note 51, at 1205-07.
53. The original version of the Sherman Amendment provided:
That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, barn or granary shall be unlawfully or
feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, wholly or in part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and
with force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or killed by any persons riotously
and tumultuously assembled together; and if such offense was committed to deprive any
person of any right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the United States,
or to deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or
previous condition of servitude, in every such case the inhabitants of the county, city, or
parish in which any of the said offenses shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to the person or persons damnified by such offense if living, or to his widow or
legal representative if dead; and such compensation may be recovered by such person or his
representative by a suit in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction in the
district in which the offense was committed, to be in the name of the person injured, or his
legal representative, and against said county, city or parish. And execution may be issued
on a judgment rendered in such suit and may be levied upon any property, real or personal,
of any person in said county, city, or parish, and the said county, city, or parish may
recover the full amount of such judgment, costs and interests, from any person or persons
engaged as principal or accessory in such riot in an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction.
GLOBE, supra note 6, at 663. Thus, the amendment would have imposed liability on the individual
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the Sherman Amendment was aimed toward preventing and compensating citizens for damage caused by riots. The House debates so important to the Monroe
Court's municipal liability holding questioned Congress' power to impose vicarious liability on cities for acts of private citizens over whom the cities had no
control. During the extensive debates the House did not consider the issue of
municipal liability under section 1983 or the meaning of the word "person" in
section 1983. Furthermore, the same Congress that passed the Civil Rights Act
also had recently defined the word "person" so that it could include "bodies
politic and corporate," 5 4 tending toward a conclusion that this Congress in55
tended municipalities to be liable under section 1983.
In rejecting municipal liability, the Monroe Court failed to heed its own
admonition that section 1983 "should be read against the background of tort
liability." '56 Examined in the context of common-law tort liability, municipal
liability should be an integral part of the complete section 1983 picture.
Although it is unclear what the Court intended the phrase "background of tort
liability" to include, 57 the Court has interpreted this phrase as applying common-law principles in existence at the time of the Act's passage, 58 as well as
current approaches to tort law.5 9 Municipal tort liability was not an unknown
citizens of a county, city, or parish for constitutional deprivations that occurred within its borders.
It was passed by the Senate, but rejected in the House. Id. at 704-05, 725, 749, 800-01.
The amendment then was referred to a conference committee, which modified it to provide:
And any payment of any judgment, or part thereof unsatisfied, recovered by the plaintiff in
such action, may, if not satisfied by the individual defendant therein within two months
next after the recovery of such judgment upon execution duly issued against such individual defendant in such judgment, and returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part be enforced
against such county, city, or parish, by execution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment, or
any other proceeding in aid of execution or applicable to the enforcement of judgments
against municipal corporations: and such judgment shall be a lien as well upon all moneys
in the treasury of such county, city, or parish, as upon the other property thereof. And the
court in any such action may on motion cause additional parties to be made therein prior
to issue joined, to the end that justice may be done. And the said county, city, or parish
may recover the full amount of such judgment, by it paid, with costs and interest, from any
person or persons engaged as principal or accessory in such riot, in an action in any court
of competent jurisdiction. And such county, city, or parish, so paying, shall also be subrogated to all the plaintiff's rights under such judgment.
Id. at 749. The second version thus differed significantly from the first. It placed liability directly on
the municipality rather than on the citizens of the municipality. The municipality's liability was
limited, however, to the amount that could not be satisfied by those actually responsible for the
deprivation. It too was ultimately rejected. Id. at 800-01. But see Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 GEo. L.J. 1483, 1527-31 (arguing that Sherman Amendment debates
reveal that Congress wanted to impose liability on a city only for the "city's" torts, not for those of
its employees).
54. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431 (repealed 1939).
55. This conclusion would not necessarily clash with the interpretation of the Act in Monroe.
Justice Douglas in Monroe simply concluded that the definition in the Dictionary Act was "merely
an allowable, not a mandatory one." Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191.
56. Id. at 187.
57. See generally Nahmod, supra note 20 (discussing the different goals and considerations involved in tort and § 1983 actions).
58. See supra note 41 and cases cited therein.
59. In Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), the Court specifically noted the
change in recent tort law from a focus on fault to a focus on accident reduction and loss spreading.
The Court cited this change as a justification for denying qualified immunities to municipalities. Id.
at 652-53.
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concept at the time the Act became law. 60 In fact, most jurisdictions held mu-

nicipalities liable for torts committed by their employees on a theory of respondeat superior.6 1 Certainly, the lawmakers of the forty-second Congress, well

versed in the law of their time, must have been aware of this fact. 62 Furtherwas therefore alive and well at
more, municipal tort liability has survived and
63
the time the Supreme Court decided Monroe.
Although the Monroe Court expressly declined to consider policy issues in

reaching its conclusion on municipal liability, 64 the case nevertheless gave mixed
policy messages. On the one hand, in determining Congressional intent, the
Monroe Court greatly expanded the scope of section 1983 by defining the "under
color of state law" language to include abuses of authority, by clarifying the
state of mind issue, and by making clear that the federal remedy provided in

section 1983 is supplemental to any other right of action. 65 At the same time,
however, Monroe provided an ineffective method of enforcement. Without municipal liability, the section 1983 remedies, though expansive in theory, are often
grossly inadequate in practice. The individual actually responsible for the civil
rights violation may be difficult to identify, may be judgment proof, or may be
entitled to assert a qualified or absolute immunity. 66 Preclusion of the employ-

60. Ample authority exists to support a conclusion that municipal liability was a well-accepted
concept in most American jurisdictions in the nineteenth century. See Note, Section 1983 Municipal
Liability and the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 939-40 (1979); see also
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 835-38 & 835 n.6 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing I W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 429-30) (doctrine of respondeatsuperior had been applied to municipal corporations at the time § 1983 was enacted); Hooe v. Alexandria, 12 F. Cas. 461
(C.C.D.C. 1802) (No. 6,667) (corporation of Alexandria answerable for conduct of street commissioners); Tallahassee v. Fortune, 3 Fla. 19 (1850) (city liable for special damages in trespass action);
Wallace v. City of Muscatine, 4 Greene 373 (Iowa 1854) (defendant city not exempt from liability
for negligent construction of drainage system); Hutson v. Mayor of New York, 9 N.Y. 163 (1853)
(city has duty to maintain roadways and is liable for negligence resulting in personal injury). But see
Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 818 n.5 (complicated municipal tort immunities existed at the time).
61. See J. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 722, at 730-31
272, 275 (1860) (city found liable for actions of city
(1872); see, e.g., Allen v. City of Decatur, 23 Ill.
supervisor who trespassed on plaintiff's land to construct roadway pursuant to an ordinance); Johnson v. Municipality No. One, 5 La. Ann. 100 (1850) (municipality held liable for damages to slave
owner when jail keeper's lack of due care resulted in death of slave); Thayer v. City of Boston, 36
Mass. (19 Pick.) 511, 516-17 (1837) (city liable for official's tortious destruction of public roadway
when act was done under authority of the city corporation); see also City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471
dissenting) (municipal liability based on respondeatsuperiorwas wellU.S. 808, 835-38 (Stevens, J.,
recognized when § 1983 enacted). But see id. at 818 n.5 (municipal liability was not that broad when
§ 1983 was enacted because "rather complicated municipal tort immunities" existed at the time).
62. In City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), the Court refined its directive from Monroe that § 1983 be read "against the background of tort liability." Monroe, 365 U.S. at
187. The Court in Fact Concers stated that "[o]ne important assumption underlying the Court's
decisions in this area is that members of the 42nd Congress were familiar with common-law principles ... previously recognized in ordinary tort litigation, and that they likely intended these common-law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary." Id. at 258.
63. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 1051-55 (W. Keeton 5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. But see Shapo, Municipal Liabilityfor Police Torts: An
Analysis of a Strand ofAmerican LegalHistory, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV.475, 478-79 (1963) (discussing
general municipal immunity from liability for actions of police officers).
64. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 33-38.
66. The Supreme Court has recognized both qualified and absolute immunities from § 1983
liability on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (recognizing absolute immunity of prosecuting attorney); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)
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ing municipality as a defendant in these situations defeats recovery altogether,
and the great potential for deterrence of unconstitutional behavior and recompense for violations of civil rights is effectively frustrated. Furthermore, by rejecting municipal liability, the Court obliterated section 1983 remedies for the
most dangerous threat to individual liberties-the potential for widespread institutional abuses of power. 67 The Monroe Court failed to recognize the need to
focus responsibility for the unconstitutional conduct of those representing the
municipality on the municipality itself.
The reinvigoration of section 1983 after Monroe caused a tremendous increase in litigation under the statute. 68 However, the restrictive interpretation of
"person" as excluding municipalities so limited the potential for recovery that
litigants sought ways to circumvent the Monroe holding. Despite the specificity
of the language in Monroe denying municipal liability, consistent efforts were
made to narrow the language's application. For example, questions arose regarding whether Monroe precluded section 1983 actions against municipal defendants who would not have been immune under state law69 and whether
Monroe applied to plaintiffs seeking equitable relief rather than damages.7 0 For
more than a decade after Monroe, the Court maintained a resolute silence on the
issue of municipal liability, leaving lower courts and litigants to draw their own
conclusions about the reach of the holding. In the face of this silence, efforts at
avoiding the municipal liability holding went unimpeded. It seemed the Court
had become content with allowing lower courts to draw on the blank canvas of
municipal liability left after Monroe.
In 1973, however, the Court broke its silence. In Moor v. County of Alameda 7 1 and City ofKenosha v. Bruno7 2 the Court rebuffed efforts to narrow the
scope of the Monroe municipal liability holding. In Moor plaintiffs argued that
the conduct of county law enforcement officers during a political demonstration
was unconstitutional. The Court held that Monroe applied even though defend(recognizing qualified immunity of school boards); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974)
(recognizing qualified executive immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 557 (1967) (recognizing absolute judicial immunity and qualified immunity of police officers based on good faith);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (recognizing absolute legislative immunity).

67. See Whitman, supra note 20, at 33 n.144; see also id. at 49-50 (institutional responsibility for
constitutional harm is a more pervasive problem than individual deprivations).
68. See sources cited supra note 20.
69. Some § 1983 plaintiffs argued that § 1983 provided an inadequate remedy because it denied
recovery against municipal defendants. Thus, these plaintiffs could resort to state law under § 1988,
which allows resort to state law if the laws of the United States do not provide a suitable remedy.
See 42 U.SC. § 1988 (1982). Under this theory, if the municipality was not immune under state law,
the plaintiff should recover. See, eg., Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also
Eisenberg, State Law in FederalCivil Rights Cases: The ProperScope of Section 1988, 128 U. PA. L.
RaV. 499, 525 (1980) (Although federal courts generally look to state law when a gap exists in the
federal law, § 1988 does not mandate that result.).
70. Plaintiffs attempting to limit Monroe in this way argued that plaintiffs in Monroe sought
monetary damages and not equitable relief. They argued that the Monroe municipal liability holding
should not extend to cases in which equitable relief was sought. See, eg., Garren v. City of WinstonSalem, 439 F.2d 140, 141 (4th Cir. 1971).
71. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
72. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
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ants were not immune under state law.73 In Kenosha, in which plaintiffs sought
equitable relief against municipal enforcement of a licensing statute, the Court
flatly stated that municipalities could not be defendants in a section 1983 suit
regardless of what type of relief plaintiffs sought. 74
Although the Court rejected efforts to limit the reach of the Monroe municipal liability holding and resisted the pressure to reconsider its conclusion on that
issue, it created considerable confusion by deciding a number of cases that imposed liability on school boards75 and on officials acting in their official capacities 76 that arguably were inconsistent with Monroe.77 These cases against school
boards as arms of local government and against officials acting in official capacities as representatives of local government were for all practical purposes suits
against the municipality itself because judgments generally were paid with government funds or from government provided insurance. 78 Thus, the need for

reconsideration of the section 1983 municipal liability issue became more and
more apparent.
B.

Monell v. Department of Social Services---A Reinterpretationof
Legislative History Creates A DistortedSketch

In Monell v. Departmentof Social Services,79 less than two decades after the
Supreme Court had determined in Monroe that municipalities were not "per-

sons" within the meaning of section 1983, the Court reversed its position and
decided that Congress had not intended municipalities to enjoy absolute immu-

nity from section 1983 liability. 80 To reach this conclusion the Court engaged in
a searching reexamination of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1871. Plaintiffs in Monell were pregnant employees compelled to take unpaid
leaves of absence before the leaves were medically necessary pursuant to an official policy of the Department of Social Services and the New York City Board of
73. Moor, 411 U.S. at 710.
74. Kenosha, 412 U.S. at 513. However, the Court in Kenosha left open the possibility that
plaintiffs might reach municipalities by suing municipal employees in their official capacities. See id.
at 514.
75. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S.
696 (1974); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
76. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 341-50 (1976) (suit allowed against police chief
acting in his official capacity); City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 426 U.S.
283, 284 n. I (1976) (individual city council members acting in official capacity amenable to suit, but
not city or city council).
77. For a pre-Monell discussion of inconsistencies raised by the Kenosha official capacity loophole, see Levin, supra note 53, at 1496-1504.
78. Although the type and adequacy of protection varies considerably, many jurisdictions have
statutes providing protection to government officials sued in their official capacities. These statutes
range from legal defense statutes providing attorneys with reimbursement for legal expenses and
court costs, to statutes requiring local governments to provide insurance coverage or indemnification
for officials sued in their official capacities. For a discussion of the various approaches, see Yudof,
Liability for Constitutional Torts and the Risk-Averse Public School Official, 49 S. CAL. L. REv.
1322, 1383-92 (1976).
79. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
80. See id. at 690.
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Education. 8 ' Plaintiffs sought equitable relief in the form of back pay. The dis-

trict court denied relief because the awards would "in the last analysis, be paid
by the City of New York,"'82 and the United States Court of Appeals for the
83
Second Circuit affirmed.
In overruling Monroe and concluding that Congress intended section 1983

"4persons" to include municipalities, the Court undertook a "fresh analysis" 84 of
the legislative history leading to passage of the Civil Rights Act. In particular,
the Court focused on its prior interpretation of the House's rejection of the Sher-

man Amendment as an indication that Congress believed it had no power to
impose civil liability on municipalities.8 5 A reexamination of the debates convinced Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of seven, that Congress' concern
had been with imposing on municipalities obligations to keep the peace that
Congress had no constitutional power to impose, 86 rather than with its power to

create civil remedies against municipalities. 87 In addition, the majority noted

that the Sherman Amendment was intended neither to amend nor to address the
same problem addressed by section 1 of the Act. 88 From its extensive reexamination of the debates on the Sherman Amendment, the Court concluded that
nothing "would have prevented holding a municipality liable under § 1 of the

Civil Rights Act for its own violations of the Fourteenth Amendment." 89
The Court focused on the debates surrounding section 1 of the Act to dis-

cern what Congress intended to include in the language "any person." The
Court noted Congress' intent to create a remedy of great scope for violations of

civil rights under color of state law. 90 Therefore, it concluded "since Congress
intended § 1 to be broadly construed, there is no reason to suppose that municipal corporations would have been excluded from the sweep of § 1."I' As further

support for its conclusion that municipalities are section 1983 "persons," the
Court recognized that in 1871 corporations, including municipal corporations,
81. Id. at 660-61.
82. Monell, 394 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
83. Monell, 532 F.2d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
84. Monell, 436 U.S. at 665.
85. Id. at 664.
86. Id. at 668.
87. Id. at 669.
88. Id. at 664.
89. Id. at 683.
90. The Court quoted Representative Shellabarger, who explained the function of the statute:
[Section 1] not only provides a civil remedy for persons whose former condition may have
been that of slaves, but also to all people where, under color of State law, they or any of
them may be deprived of rights to which they are entitled under the Constitution by reason
and virtue of their national citizenship.
Id. at 683 (quoting Gi.ont, supra note 6, app. at 68).
In describing how the courts should interpret § 1,the Court noted that Shellabarger stated:
"'This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and beneficently construed.
It would be most strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the rule on interpretation.'"
Id. at 684 (quoting Gi.ou, supra note 6, app. at 68).
91. Id. at 686.
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were considered natural persons for legal purposes. 92 The Court had ignored
this fact in its earlier decision in Monroe. Finally, the Court looked again to the
1871 statutory definition of "person" and this time concluded "[m]unicipal corporations in 1871 were included within the phrase 'bodies politic and corporate'
and, accordingly, the 'plain meaning' of § 1 is that local government bodies were
to be included within the ambit of the persons who could be sued under § 1 of
' 93
the Civil Rights Act.
The reinterpretation of "person" to include municipalities had the potential
to expand greatly the section 1983 remedies, but the Court stopped short of
realizing the full scope of municipal liability. Although the Court purported to
create only a "sketchy" picture of section 1983 municipal liability, it went be94
yond what was necessary for its resolution of the problem presented in Monel1
by commenting on the basis of municipal liability. The Court concluded that
although Congress had intended municipalities to be considered section 1983
"persons," Congress had not intended municipalities to be held liable based on a
theory of respondeat superior for civil rights violations committed by their
employees.
The Court reasoned that municipalities incur liability under section 1983
only for injuries caused by "execution of a government's policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy."'9 5 To support its conclusion, the Court looked
first to the language of the statute itself. It inferred from Congress' use of the
phrase "subject or cause to be subjected" an intent to impose liability on a municipality only for harms it has actually caused 96 and then concluded that a
97
municipality inflicts harm only through its official policies or customs.
The Court was not content with interpreting the words of the statute, however. It looked again to the legislative history and interpreted Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment as an indication that Congress intended to
exclude respondeat superior as a basis of section 1983 municipal liability. The
Court believed that imposing liability based on respondeat superior would run
afoul of the Constitution by imposing on municipalities an obligation to keep the
peace-the very problem Congress had addressed in choosing to defeat the
Sherman Amendment. 98 By rejecting respondeat superior, the Court failed to
render a complete and comprehensible sketch of municipal liability.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 687.
Id. at 689-90.
See supra note 32.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 693.
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DISTORTION RESULTS FROM AN ERROR IN PERSPECTIVE

Rejection of Respondeat Superior-A Second Misinterpretationof
CongressionalIntent

Despite the Court's contrary conclusion in Monell, it can be argued that
Congress intended to impose municipal liability based on respondeat superior.
Thus, the Court's interpretation of both the language of the statute and its legislative history arguably was flawed. 99 Justice Brennan concluded that a municipality cannot be held liable "solely because it employs a tort feasor-or, in other
words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." 10 0 He decided that the language "shall subject or cause to be subjected" in the statute "cannot be easily read to impose liability vicariously on
governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an employer- employee
relationship with a tort feasor." 10 1 Justice Brennan also noted, "[T]he fact that
Congress did specifically provide that A's tort became B's liability if B 'caused'
A to subject another to a tort suggests that Congress did not intend § 1983 liability to attach where such causation was absent." 10 2 In the context of municipal liability, the proper question is how can A, the one who suffered a
constitutional injury, establish that the injury was caused by B, the municipality.
Justice Brennan concluded that such causation exists only if "execution of a
government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflict[s] the
't 0 3
injury."
A construction of the causation language that rejects respondeat superioris
erroneous for several reasons. First, the language "subject or cause to be subjected" suggests that Congress envisioned at least two scenarios. One situation
would be a section 1983 "person" acting to subject another to a constitutional
harm. In such a case the defendant actively causes the harm. The language
"cause to be subjected," however, suggests a very different situation. The use of
passive voice indicates that Congress also intended to impose liability for constitutional harm on those who have not themselves done the "subjecting," but
rather are responsible for those who have. ° 4 In such cases the defendant need
99. See, e.g., City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Levin, supra note 53, at 1519; Note, Monell v. Department of Social Services: One Step ForNardand
a Half Step Back for Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 7 HOrsTRA L. REV. 893, 894-95
(1979); Note, supra note 60, at 970. But see Nahmod, supra note 37, at 32 (government liability
properly depends on unconstitutional conduct of local government itself).
100. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

101. Id. at 691-92.
102. Id. at 692.
103. Id. at 694.
104. In one sense, the word "subject" and the phrase "cause to be subjected" can be understood
as having identical meanings. The latter phrase is simply a more ponderous expression of the first.
That is, in the sense of bringing one under the influence or control of something, it is possible to
subject one to something or cause one to be subjected to something, and the two expressions carry
the same meaning. However, if "subject" and "cause to be subjected" are not merely redundant, illconstructed phrases (something not to be presumed of Congress), the two elements must have some
alternative meanings. That "subject" means directly affect and "cause to be subjected" means indirectly affect are the probable alternative meanings.
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not have actively caused the harm to fall within the causation language. Thus,
Congress took into account that responsibility for constitutional harm exists in
the absence of actual participation in the events giving rise to the constitutional
10 5
deprivation.
Moreover, Justice Brennan's interpretation of the language ignored the fact
that municipalities are legal entities that can act only through the conduct of
employees or agents.' 0 6 All municipal torts are caused by the conduct of municipal representatives 10 7 and any liability imposed on the municipal entity necessarily is vicarious. The Court's focus on governmental policy that causes
constitutional harm is artificial, unfair, and illogical. The policy or custom requirement singles out a particular kind of conduct by a particular category of
municipal employee. Under this approach municipalities must take responsibility for the acts of high level policy making employees for the creation of policy
or custom that results in constitutional harm, but not for the acts of low level,
frontline employees whose conduct in carrying out their responsibilities as municipal employees results in constitutional harm. This distinction does not comport with the sweeping impact Congress intended for section 1983. If Congress
intended municipalities to be section 1983 "persons," it is unlikely that it intended them to be insulated from liability for the tortious acts of its employees
or agents. These municipal employees or agents have day-to-day contact with
the public. This contact exposes the public to a tremendous risk of invasions of
civil rights.
In addition, Justice Brennan erroneously assumed that imposing liability
based on respondeatsuperior and the statute's actual causation requirement are
mutually exclusive.' l0 Actual causation is an element that the plaintiff must
prove in any tort case regardless of the legal theory of liability.' 0 9 To recover in
any case based on respondeat superior, the plaintiff must prove that a servant
acting within the scope of employment caused the harm."10 If a municipality
can act only through the conduct of its agents, and if a municipality is a "person" for purposes of section 1983, then the municipality can "subject or cause to
105. But see Nahmod, supra note 37, at 17-22 (arguing that the § 1983 defendant's conduct must
itself violate the fourteenth amendment and cause the plaintiff's constitutional deprivation).
106. This obvious fact has not gone unrecognized by courts. For example, the court in Adekalu
v. New York City, 431 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), noted that "all municipal actions are performed for the municipality by its human agents.... All municipal liability is, in a sense, 'vicarious
....... Id. at 819. In a case involving the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court recognized:
"A State acts by its legislative, its executive or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way."
Ex Porte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879); see Schnapper, Civil Rights LitigationAfter Monell, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 213, 217 (1979).
107. This fact has been recognized by at least one member of the Supreme Court. Justice Ste-

vens in his dissenting opinion in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985), noted, "It is
now settled that the word 'person' encompasses municipal corporations, and, of course, it was true in
1871 as it is today, that corporate entities can only act through their human agents." Id. at 834-35

(Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. See Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior," in HARVARD LEGAL. ESSAYS 433,
435-37 (1934).
109. 1 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS lvii-lviii (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter HARPER, JAMES & GRAY]; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 63, § 41, at 263.
110. 5 HARPER, JAMES, & GRAY, supra note 109, § 26.7, at 24; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
63, § 69, at 500; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(l) (1958).
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be subjected" another to constitutional harm only if its agent's conduct causes
that harm. This proposition is true regardless of whether that representative is a

high level policymaking employee or a low level employee.
Furthermore, to impose municipal liability based on respondeat superior is

not to impose liability "solely because [the municipality] employs a tortfeasor.""t' The very existence of the employer-employee relationship gives rise
to the risk section 1983 was created to address-that a constitutional violation

will occur "under color of state law." Those who act within the scope of their
employment for a municipality necessarily are acting "under color of state law."
Municipal employees, especially law enforcement personnel, regularly engage in
transactions having a high potential for constitutional harm.112 They are en-

trusted with dangerous weapons; they often subject citizens to confinement; they
make bodily contact with citizens; and they undertake searches of private prop-

erty. Because of the employer's governmental status, such violations necessarily
are under color of state law, even if in the particular situation the employee has

exceeded or acted contrary to his or her authority.'13 When the particular risk
created by the governmental employment situation arises, then the employing

municipality is the effective cause of the harm and should take responsibility for
it.114 If the municipal employment situation creates a risk of constitutional injury and a municipal employee in fact causes constitutional harm, the municipality should be liable.' 15
The respondeatsuperiorrequirement that acts must be "in the scope of em-

ployment" to establish liability is analogous to the "under color of state law"
requirement necessary to establish section 1983 liability. To hold employers lia111. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
112. Law enforcement personnel certainly are not the only municipal employees able to perpetrate constitutional violations on citizens. Those entrusted with the responsibility of implementing
zoning or licensing ordinances are also in positions to enforce those ordinances in ways that result in
deprivations of civil rights. See, eg., Bennett v. City of Slidell, 697 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1983), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 728 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane), reh'g denied, 735 F.2d 861 (5th Cir.
1984) (per curiam) (en bane), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 3476 (1985); Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979

(5th Cir. 1982).
113. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184.
114. Professor Seavey, in an essay on the subject of respondeat superior,stated:
[A]s to the legalistic objection that a master is not in any sense a cause of the harm which
results from conduct of a servant within the scope of the employment which the master
neither commanded nor intended: It may be admitted that frequently he is no more a
direct cause of the resulting harm than is a bailor or one employing an independent contractor; but it may be questioned whether such persons are not usually effective causes of
the harm which results from the use of the things bailed or the work done by the contractor. If there is an absence of liability, it is because of the lack of elements other than
causation ....[B]y entrusting an instrumentality to a servant who causes an injury by its
use, a master has caused, in a reasonably direct sense, the resulting harm.
Seavey, supra note 108, at 435 (citations omitted).
115. One noted § 1983 scholar has cast this notion in terms of whether a fourteenth amendment
duty exists. See S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIEs LITIGATION §§ 3.13, 6.06 (1979);
Nahmod, supra note 37, at 22-32. Professor Nahmod's position is that because the duty concept is
so tied to the concept of negligence, a focus on duty tends to lead to the erroneous notion that fault is
an element of a § 1983 action. A focus on responsibility for the creation of a risk, however, reduces
the danger that extraneous fault considerations will be injected. See infra notes 264-81 and accompanying text; see also Mead, supranote 37, at 360 (risk analysis approach suggested as a way to avoid
focus on fault).
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ble under a respondeat superiortheory for the tortious conduct of their employ1 16
ees, the employees must have acted within the scope of their employment.
Although interpretations of the "scope of employment" concept vary,1 17 this
concept does include conduct not actually authorized by the employer, or even
conduct forbidden by the employer. 1 18 The Supreme Court's interpretation of
the meaning of "under color of state law" in Monroe to include unauthorized
conduct of government employees is strikingly similar. 19 Thus, if action taken
by a municipal employee resulting in constitutional harm fulfills the "under
color of state law" requirement, it almost certainly would be within the "scope
of employment." The compatibility of these two concepts makes the application
of respondeatsuperiorespecially appropriate for section 1983 municipal liability.
To justify his interpretation of the statutory causation language, Justice
Brennan looked again to the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act. He
noted that when Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment it rejected "the
only form of vicarious liability presented to it."' 12 0 Justice Brennan recognized
that this rejection did not "conclusively establish that it -would similarly have
refused to impose vicarious liability for the torts of a municipality's employees." 12 1 However, he inferred from Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment and the absence of language in section 1983 creating liability based on
122
respondeat superior "that Congress did not intend to impose such liability.'
Justice Brennan's analysis is faulty. To infer from Congress' rejection of
the vicarious liability in the Sherman Amendment an intent to reject respondeat
superior in section 1983 overlooks the very distinction between the Sherman
Amendment and section 1983 that the Court had specifically recognized in the
116. 5 HARPER, JAMES, & GRAY, supranote 109, § 26.7, at 24; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
63, § 69, at 500; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
117. At one time it was reasonably well-settled that servants acted within the scope of their
employment only if they acted with a purpose to serve the master. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1) (1958). Under this approach unauthorized activities of employees would
not fall within the scope of employment. Masters escaped liability for such things as injuries caused
by intentional tort or during a "frolic" or "detour." The motive test has largely given way to a focus
on the responsibility an enterprise should take for injuries that "may fairly be said to be characteristic of its activities." Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968).
For early recognition of this "enterprise liability" approach, see 5 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY,
supra note 109, § 26.5, at 19-20; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 63, § 70, at 502-07; Laski, The
Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 112-13 (1916); Smith, Frolic andDetour, 23 COLUM.
L. REV. 716, 718 (1923).
118. See, e.g., Wood v. Central Arkansas Milk Producers Ass'n, 233 Ark. 958, 959, 349 S.W.2d
811, 812 (1961) (Defendant's employee caused injury in a truck he was forbidden to use, and the
court held that "[w]hen an employee is acting in furtherance of his employer's business the latter is
liable for the employee's negligence although the particular act is unauthorized or even contrary to
express instructions."); Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 623, 124 Cal. Rptr.
143, 151 (1975) (When plaintiff was assaulted by defendant's employee, the court held that "[i]t was
manifestly an outgrowth of the employment relationship and a risk which may fairly be considered
as typical of, or incidental to, the employment.").
119. This interpretation is not at odds with the Monroe municipal liability holding. The reason
the Monroe Court denied municipal liability was its conclusion that Congress did not intend to
include municipalities within the meaning of "person" as used in the statute. See supra notes 42-78
and accompanying text.
120. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692-93 n.57.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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first part of its opinion.12 3 The vicarious liability proposed in the Sherman
Amendment would have made municipalities liable for actions ofprivatecitizens
over which the municipality had no control.124 Section 1983, however, was
aimed at unconstitutional activity under color of state law. The very fact of the
employment relationship between the tortfeasor and the governmental body was

the focus of section 1983. Thus, it is unlikely that Congress' rejection of a broad
form of vicarious liability was also a rejection of respondeat superior,which is a
narrow type of vicarious liability for tortious acts of employees. 12 5 Moreover,
although justifications for imposing respondeat superior have varied over the
years,126 limitations on the doctrine always have existed.'

27

Thus, rejection of

one type of vicarious liability does not justify an inference that Congress intended to reject all forms of vicarious liability. The purpose of section 1983 and
the broad scope of its protection indicate that Congress expected municipalities
to be liable based on respondeat superior. Another criticism of the Monell

Court's use of legislative history is that the Court selectively read the debates
that make up much of the legislative history of section 1983. For instance, the
Court failed to take into account the references in the debates to the intended

scope of section 1983. Although section 1 of the Act was not the subject of
much discussion in the forty-second Congress, portions of the debates show that
Congress intended the statute to be broadly remedial and construed liberally.12 8

By rejecting respondeat superior in favor of the policy or custom requirement,
however, the Court greatly limited, and in some cases completely eliminated, the

availability of section 1983 remedies. Thus, the restrictions on recovery imposed
123. See id. at 664.
124. See supra note 53.
125. See Seavey, supra note 108, at 433.
126. Early justifications for imposing liability on employers for the tortious conduct of their
employees included the employer's right to control the behavior of the employee, the employer's
opportunity to choose the employee, and the employer's privilege to employ another. For general
discussion of vicarious liability justifications, see T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 146-54 (1916);
Baty, The Basis of Responsibility, 32 JURID. REV. 159 (1920); James, VicariousLiability, 28 TUL. L.
REv. 161 (1954); Smith, supranote 117. These justifications have never been particularly effective at
hiding the main rationale, which is the search for a deep pocket from which to satisfy an innocent
injured plaintiff. Modern approaches to respondeatsuperiorhave been more realistic in recognizing a
deliberate decision to allocate the risk of injuries occasioned by an employer's enterprise to the enterprise itself. The justifications range from economic theory to a recognition that injuries occasioned
by the enterprise are inevitable and in fairness should be borne by those who choose to engage in the
enterprise for their own benefit. See Douglas, VicariousLiability and Administration of Risk (pts. I
& 2), 38 YALE L.J. 584, 720 (1929); Laski, supra note 117, at 112; Seavey, supra note 108, at 445-51;
Smith, supra note 117, at 718; see also 5 HARPER, JAMEs & GRAY, supra note 109, § 26.5, at 19-20
(enterprise liability provides effective means of distributing losses among beneficiaries of risk-creating
enterprise); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 63, § 69, at 500 (modern justification for enterprise
liability is deliberate allocation of risk).
127. The major limitation on the kind of vicarious liability imposed by respondeatsuperioris that
it is restricted to an employer's responsibility for the tortious acts of employees. Even with a modern
enterprise liability approach, the tortfeasor must have been an employee, or in certain special circumstances an independent contractor, and the injury must have occurred under circumstances
characteristic of the enterprise's activities. See Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d
167 (2d Cir. 1968).
128. Senator Thurman remarked, in objecting to the Act, that "there is no limitation whatsoever
upon the terms that are employed, and they are as comprehensive as can be used." Globe, supra note
6, app. at 216-17; see also supra note 7 (Representative Shellabarger pointed out that the Act is not
limited to protection of former slaves but extends to all citizens).

1987]

SECTION 1983 MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

by the Court's rejection of respondeat superior conflict with the expansive remedies Congress intended.
Furthermore, the Court's focus on the constitutional implications of Congressional rejection of the Sherman Amendment also is misplaced. The Court
labored under the erroneous impression that imposing municipal liability based
on respondeat superior suffered from the same constitutional infirmities as the
Sherman Amendment.' 29 However, the Court successfully demonstrated in the
first part of its Monell opinion that the Amendment offered a radically different
solution to the problems addressed by the Civil Rights Act than the solution
proposed by section 1983.130 Congress questioned the constitutionality of the
Sherman Amendment because it imposed on municipalities a responsibility to
keep the peace by imposing liability for the acts of private citizens. Section 1983
liability based on respondeat superior,on the other hand, would impose liability
only for unconstitutional acts of municipal employees. Thus, respondeat superior would not impose on municipalities a responsibility to maintain police forces
to keep the peace.
Also, although the Court read "the language of § 1983 ... against the background of ... legislative history,"' 131 it failed to follow its own directive from
Monroe that section 1983 should be "read against the background of tort liability."' 132 The Court specifically noted the absence of language in the statute creating liability based on respondeat superior.1 33 Yet the Court was satisfied with
drawing negative inferences from that silence. This reasoning conflicts with the
Court's approach in other section 1983 situations in which it has faced statutory
silence. 134 In the face of silence the Court has looked to the background of tort
liability to help it determine the historical context in which the forty-second
Congress worked. The Court has drawn the conclusion that if Congress had
35
wanted to deviate from well- established tort principles it would have said so.1
At the time Monell was decided it was well-established that in the absence of
guidance in the statute, the Court would look to the background of tort liability. 1 3 6 Had the Court looked to the background of municipal tort liability that
existed in 1871,137 it would have found strong reason to base section 1983 mu129. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 693-94.
130. Id. at 665-83.
131. Id. at 691.
132. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187 (emphasis added).
133. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692 n.57.
134. A prime example of the Court's resort to the background of tort liability is the area of
§ 1983 immunities. The Court regularly has stated that if the forty-second Congress had intended to
abrogate well-established immunities of particular types of state actors, it would have said so in the
statute. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 316-18 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 242-49 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367, 376 (1951).
135. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258-59 (1981).
136. The Court refined this idea further in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247
(1981), when it made absolutely clear that in the absence of a provision in the statute, an assumption
is made that the forty-second Congress was familiar with established common-law tort principles.
id. at 258.
137. See supra note 60.
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nicipal liability on respondeat superior.'38 Although its sources are not alto39
gether clear, the legal doctrine of respondeat superioris several centuries old. 1
Certainly in 1871 when Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act, respondeatsupe-

rior was well recognized as a theory for imposing liability on employers for the
tortious activity of employees. 1t4 Moreover, it was regularly applied to municipalities. 14 1 Because of the common-law tort background and the well-established tradition of construing section 1983 to incorporate common-law

principles,14 2 the Court unjustifiably relied on statutory silence to support its
rejection of respondeat superior.
B. Policies Favoringthe Inclusion of Respondeat Superior in the
Section 1983 Picture
This Article already has suggested that the legislative history of section
1983, the language of the statute, and the background of tort liability all support
a conclusion that respondeat superior is the appropriate basis for section 1983

municipal liability. The strongest arguments in favor of respondeat superior as
the appropriate basis for section 1983 municipal liability, however, are policy
arguments. The Court failed to consider policy in Monell, even though the
Court has found policy relevant in other section 1983 cases. 14 3 In fact, the

Court has even suggested that policy considerations might be determinative in
some cases.144 Thus, if the Court were to acknowledge its error in the interpre-

tation of congressional intent in Monell, policy considerations would warrant a
1 45
reconsideration of the respondeatsuperior issue.
An obvious similarity exists between the policy rationales posited to justify
respondeatsuperiorgenerally and the justifications underlying the passage of section 1983. Although the reasons for imposing liability on employers based on
respondeat superior vary, 146 those propounded most frequently are the need to

compensate innocent victims of tortious conduct and the desire to prevent future
accidents. 47 Similarly, the Court frequently has stated that the goals of the
138. See supra note 61.
139. See 5 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 109, § 26.2, at 8-10; PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 63, § 69, at 500. But see Laski, supra note 117, at 106 (claiming to find no reference to vicarious
liability until 1688).
140. See supra note 61.
141. See supra note 60.
142. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258-59 (1981).
143. See, e.g., id. at 263 (punitive damages are an effective deterrent when assessed against public
officials, but public policy precludes assessment against innocent taxpayers); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652-53 (1980) (reasons for extending qualified immunity to public officials
are less compelling when liability of municipality is at issue).
144. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266 (1981).
145. Unfortunately, although at least one member of the Court favors reconsideration of the
respondeat superiorconclusion reached in Monell, City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
834-44 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting), it seems unlikely that the Court will address that issue again.
Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist in a footnote in Tuttle indicated that the plurality saw no
reason to deviate from the well-established principle of stare decisis. Id. at 818 n.5.
146. See supra note 126.
147. 5 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 109, § 26.5, at 21; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
63, § 69, at 500-01.
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section 1983 remedies include compensation to injured victims, the prevention of
future injury, and the vindication of important constitutional rights.1 48 That the
goals of section 1983 may best be achieved by imposing liability on the municipality based on a loss spreading rationale coincides with modern justifications
for respondeat superior.'49
This compatibility of goals makes respondeat superior uniquely well suited
to further the policies of the statute. Compensation and deterrence considerations would be advanced consistently if respondeat superior were the basis of
section 1983 municipal liability. The victim of constitutional injury who cannot
identify the municipal employee responsible for the injury or satisfy a judgment
against the actor may go uncompensated unless he or she can recover from the
municipality on a respondeatsuperior theory. Moreover, forcing municipalities
to be responsible for their employees' unconstitutional conduct encourages care
in the hiring, training, and supervision of municipal employees. This care, in
turn, should reduce the number of constitutional injuries. Although imposing
liability on the individual actually responsible for the harm may deter that individual, 150 municipal liability for acts of employees focuses attention on the problem of the unfit employee and the potential for widespread institutional abuses.
Respondeat superiorliability occasionally may cause the municipality to pay for
an employee's aberrational behavior that it could neither predict nor prevent.
However, in light of the statute's goals, this possibility is preferable to the possibility that victims of constitutional harm will not be compensated. Municipalities are aware when hiring personnel that the nature of certain sensitive
governmental jobs puts certain employees in positions having direct and special
effect on the valued interests of the citizenry. These functions create or increase
the risk that the governmental operatives will infringe civil liberties. If the risk
of constitutional injury thus created or increased is realized, the municipality
should take responsibility.
An emphasis on compensation and deterrence accords with the modern enterprise liability approach to both respondeat superior1 5' and section 1983 municipal liability. 152 This approach consciously allocates the risk of loss to the
enterprise creating and benefiting from the activity that creates the potential for
injury. The risk of loss should fall on the entrepreneur, who is in the best position to prevent the loss and to spread the cost of the loss through either insur148. See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500-07 (1982) (vindication of rights);
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638-41 (1980) (vindication of rights); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14,
20-25 (1980) (compensation and deterrence); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-52
(1980) (preservation of human liberty and human rights); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584,
592-93 (1978) (deterrence).
149. See 5 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 109, § 26.5, at 20-23; PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 63, § 69, at 500-01.
150. Of course, even if respondeatsuperiorwere accepted as the basis of § 1983 municipal liability, the individual tortfeasor would still be personally liable. Respondeat superiorsimply gives the
victim a deep pocket to fall back on in the not unusual event that the tortfeasor is unable to satisfy a
judgment. See T. BATY, supra note 126, at 154; 3 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 109, § 12.4,
at 120-24.
151. See cases cited supra note 148.
152. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980).
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ance or higher prices.15' Although enterprise liability usually is justified on an
55
economic efficiency rationale,' 54 considerations of fairness are also important.
Employers are in a better position to appreciate the inevitability of harm that the
enterprise will cause, to take measures to prevent as much harm as possible, and
to insure against harm that actually occurs.
Similarly, an enterprise liability approach addresses the proper concerns of
section 1983 municipal liability. Certainly the municipality is in a far better
position than the victim to prevent constitutional harm. Furthermore, the cost
of constitutional injury caused by municipal employees would be spread among
the taxpayers who benefit from the services the municipality provides. Compensation for constitutional harm would constitute a cost of doing government business that the community as a whole would bear. If the cost of constitutional
injury became too high, the municipal officials would be pressured through the
political process to take measures to prevent injury and thus reduce the cost. In
Monell the Court specifically noted that the need for accident reduction and cost
spreading "to the community as a whole on an insurance theory"' 156 justifies
imposing respondeatsuperiorliability. The Court, however, rejected both rationales because Congress had found them insufficient to overcome the constitutional objections to the Sherman Amendment.' 57 It is impossible to know
whether the Court would have found these rationales more persuasive in the
absence of the perceived constitutional impediments to embracing respondeat
superior. Since Monell the Court has approved the accident reduction rationale,
the cost spreading rationale, and the fairness rationale as reasons for imposing
strict liability on municipalities.15 8 This approval suggests that, but for the constitutional problems, the Court would have acknowledged the benefits attainable
from basing section 1983 municipal liability on respondeat superior.
Possible objections to respondeatsuperiorin section 1983 municipal liability
cases mirror the Court's current negative attitude toward the section 1983 action
generally. A likely objection might be that liability based on respondeatsuperior
would increase the number of section 1983 municipal liability cases, adding even
more cases to federal dockets already overcrowded with section 1983 cases. A
related problem of particular interest today in the era of the "insurance crisis" is
that this increase in cases would have a negative impact on municipal treasuries.
Protection of the municipal fise has always been a concern in the context of the
Civil Rights Act. Opponents of the Sherman Amendment expressed concern
that the liability suggested there would "prove utterly destructive of the State
153, See, e.g., Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 141 (Alaska 1972); Rodgers v. Kemper Constr.
Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 608, 618, 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 148 (1975); see also G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS
OF ACCIDENTS 50-54 (1970) (summarizing meaning of enterprise liability); Klemme, The Enterprise
Liability Theory of Torts, 47 COLO. L. REV. 153 (1976) (summarizing purpose and meaning of enterprise liability).
154. G. CALABRESI, supra note 153, at 53; Klemme, supra note 153, at 175-78.
155. See, e.g., Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968).
156. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
157. Id.
158. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652-56 (1980); see infra text accompanying
notes 219-26.

1987]

SECTION 1983 MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

municipalities!"' 1 59 The cost to municipalities of section 1983 cases has been
perceived as a potential problem even without respondeatsuperior.160 Although

a majority of the Court has never cited this difficulty to justify denying section
1983 municipal liability, this difficulty has prompted some of the Court's members to express concern.161 Certainly ample evidence exists that municipalities
are finding it more and more difficult to obtain insurance against ordinary tort

liability and have begun to withdraw from activities likely to expose them to
liability. 1 62 Municipalities are unable, however, to withdraw from the kinds of

activities that expose them to section 1983 liability.
The potential problems associated with imposing municipal liability based
on respondeatsuperior are serious ones. If policy is to be considered a factor in
the Court's approach to a section 1983 municipal liability case, competing policies must be compared and evaluated. However, in other section 1983 cases the
Court has already addressed and largely solved the problems that might arise in

a section 1983 municipal liability setting. The Court has dealt with the flood of
section 1983 cases and its related concern-frivolous claims-by redefining the
proof needed to establish the violation of a constitutional right. 163 If a potential
section 1983 plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional harm, he or she cannot
state a claim under the statute, because a constitutional violation is a necessary
element of the section 1983 prima facie case. 164 In addition, the Court has seri-

ously limited the impact of section 1983 cases on municipal treasuries by its
approach to damages. Not only has the Court limited damages in all section
159. GLOBE, supra note 6, at 762.
160. But see Jaron, The Threat ofPersonalLiability Under the FederalCivil Rights Act: Does It
Interfere with the Performance of State andLocal Government?, 13 URB. LAW. 1, 2-3 (1981) (There
is "no cause for alarm."); Project, Suing the Police in FederalCourt, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 809-18 (197879) (finding costs to police departments insubstantial).
161. Monell, 436 U.S. at 664 n.9. Current publicity surrounding the difficulty in obtaining insurance supports this objection. See, eg., Lynch, The Insurance Panicfor Lawyers, A.B.A. J., July 1,
1986, at 43; Sorry America, Your Policy is Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16, 16-26; Sky-High
Damage Suits, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 27, 1986, at 35; Reid, LiabilityAnd the Insurance
Shortage, Washington Post, Mar. 24, 1986, at 6 (national weekly ed.).
162. Blodgett, Premium Hikes Stun Municipalities,A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 48-51; Hunter &
Borzelleri, The Liability InsuranceCrisis, 22 TRIAL, Apr. 1986, at 42, 42-46; Jaron,supra note 160,
at 19-21; Page & Stephens, The Products Liability Insurance "Crisis". Causes,Nostrums and Cures,
13 CAP. U.L. REV. 387, 387-404 (1984); Szabo, No Relief From The Liability Crisis,NATION'S BUS.,
Oct. 1986, at 69, 69-72.
163. Although the Court has held that § 1983 itself contains no intent or state of mind requirement, the Court recently has focused attention on the nature of the § 1983 defendant's behavior to
determine whether a constitutional right has been violated. For example, in a case in which a prisoner claimed medical malpractice constituted an eighth amendment violation, the Court determined
that the prisoner must establish deliberate indifference to establish a constitutional violation. Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), the Court held that
injury to the reputation by a state actor is not a deprivation of liberty or property protected by the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 701-10. The Court recently concluded that conduct of state officials
which was merely negligent cannot form the basis of a claim that a § 1983 plaintiff's fourteenth
amendment due process rights have been violated. Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668, 670-71
(1986); Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 663 (1986). These cases should have a dramatic effect on
the number of § 1983 cases. For a discussion of the Court's reinterpretation of the Constitution as a
device to control § 1983 litigation, see Mead, supra note 37.
164. Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 664 (1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536-37
(1981), overruled in part, Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
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1983 cases to actual economic losses, 165 it has held that municipalities are immune from punitive damage awards. 166 These constraints considerably mitigate
the potentially negative impact of section 1983 liability. In weighing the advantages of respondeat superior as the basis of section 1983 municipal liability
against the possible disadvantages, the importance of the policies to be furthered
by its application clearly tips the scale in favor of including it in the section 1983
picture.
C. The Policy or Custom Requirement-An Error in Perspective
Leads to Confusion
The most problematic aspect of the Court's rejection of respondeatsuperior
is the basis of municipal liability the Court offered in its place. As an alternative
to respondeatsuperior,the Monell majority required a showing that the municipality itself actually had caused the injury. Thus, section 1983 plaintiffs must
establish that their harm was "inflicted" by the "execution of a government's
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.' 1 67 The rejection of respondeat superiorin favor of the policy or custom causation requirement has created
an unclear depiction of section 1983 municipal liability.1 6 8 Because plaintiffs'
injuries in Monell resulted from patently unconstitutional official policy,16 9 the
Court, although Justice Powell recognized a future of "substantial line drawing
problems,"' 170 was satisfied to leave section 1983 municipal liability in this incomplete stage. Thus, the lower courts have been forced to reach their own
conclusions about how the policy or custom requirement functions in a section
1983 municipal liability case. Prompted in large measure by the potential for
tapping a defendant with a deep pocket, section 1983 plaintiffs often have joined
municipalities in their section 1983 cases, raising issues of the type of employee
conduct that should be attributed to the municipality. '71 The diverse and often
conflicting results courts have reached in these cases illustrate the confusion and
uncertainty caused by the Monell Court's choice of the policy or custom causa172
tion requirement.
The Court's failure to define either "policy" or "custom," or to explain how
a plaintiff proves that a policy or custom has caused harm created the initial
confusion. The term "policy" is especially problematic because it does not ap165. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 248 (1978).
166. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-71 (1981).
167. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
168. See infra notes 173-89 and accompanying text.
169. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
170. Id. at 713 (Powell, J., concurring).
171. See, e.g., Pirolo v. City of Clearwater, 711 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1983); Hernandez v. City of
Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981).
172. See, e.g., Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1980) (summary judgment
against plaintiff is inappropriate on issue of policy or custom in suit for arrest without valid warrant);
Tyler v. Woodson, 597 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1979) (dismissal of plaintiff's claim appropriate when
complaint fails to allege that confiscation of legal papers was done pursuant to policy or custom);
Mayes v. Elrod, 470 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (plaintiff's complaint alleging maladministration

resulting in deplorable living conditions at jail adequately describes a custom).
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pear in the statute. Rather, it is a judicial creation. In its explanation of the
concept of policy, the Court merely stated that for municipal liability to attach,
the act must "[implement or execute] a policy statement, ordinance, regulation,
' 173
or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers."
Although the Court recognized that policy is something that must be "made by
[either] lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,"1 74 the Court made no effort to explain what kind of municipal employee is in a position to make policy. Furthermore, the Court failed to
note the distinctions that might exist between the creation of policy and the
implementation of policy, or between policy that is in itself unconstitutional and
policy not in itself unconstitutional, but implemented in a way that results in
constitutional harm. Nor did the Court address the problem of a policy that
merely creates a risk that a municipal representative will cause constitutional
harm.
Unlike the word "policy," the word "custom" actually appears in the statute. The Monell Court acknowledged that section 1983 is implicated if constitutional harm is "visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a
custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels."' 175 The Court noted that it had earlier recognized that unconstitutional governmental custom and usages "could well be so permanent
76
and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law."'
However, the Court did not look to legislative history or the background of tort
liability to clarify this notion of custom.
Not only did the Court fail to explain how to determine whether a policy or
custom exists, it also did not demonstrate how to establish that a policy or custom has caused the harm. An image of a policy or custom causing harm is
difficult, if not impossible, to conceptualize. The issue of actual causation in the
common law of torts generally involves a "but for" or "substantial factor" test.
However, despite the admonition from Monroe v. Pape177 that section 1983 be
"read against the background of tort liability,"' 17 8 the Monell Court declined to
rely on tort law for its approach to causation. In fact, except to say that the
policy must "[inflict] the injury"' 1 79 and that it must be "the moving force of the
constitutional violation,"' 180 the Court did not address the causation issue. 18 1
Policy and custom as forces, moving or otherwise, defy mental imagery except in
the vaguest and most abstract ways when contemplating liability for an entity
that acts only through its employees and agents.
173. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
174. Id. at 694.
175. Id. at 691.
176. Id. (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 168 (1970)).
177. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monroe is discussed supra text accompanying notes 33-67.
178. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
179. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
180. Id.
181. For a discussion of causation problems in § 1983 litigation, see Eaton, Causation in Constitutional Tort, 67 IOWA L. REV. 443 (1982).
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The confusion created by the Court's failure to explain the policy or custom
requirement in a way that provided guidance to the lower federal courts has

been magnified by the tremendous diversity in factual patterns giving rise to
section 1983 municipal liability issues. Courts have dealt with varying situa18 3
tions, including decisions to license,1 82 decisions to grant zoning variances,
decisions to dismiss from employment, 184 and the frequently recurring problem

of police misconduct.t

85

The cases tend to fall into two categories. One category involves challenges

to an official policy, custom, or the implementation of a policy or custom.
Under this category a plaintiff maintains that a policy or custom is unconstitutional, or has the potential for unconstitutional implementation. Licensing, zoning, and employment cases fall into this category. In these cases courts must
look to the challenged policy itself to determine whether it is in fact an official

policy or custom. To reach a conclusion on this question, the courts often have
scrutinized the authority of the person or group making the decisions to determine whether they are among those whose "edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy.' t 86 If the court determines that a policy or custom is at
work, the issue may arise whether the policy or custom is itself unconstitutional,
or whether it has been implemented in an unconstitutional manner. The federal

circuit courts of appeals have reached far from uniform decisions on these
issues. 187
The second category of cases involves official misconduct by municipal employees, typically law enforcement personnel, that results in constitutional viola-

tions. These cases raise more complex problems for plaintiffs. To fulfill the
Monell policy or custom causation requirement, the section 1983 plaintiff must

establish that the employee's objectionable conduct resulted from an official policy or custom. In effect, a dual causation requirement is imposed. The miscon182. See, e.g., Bennett v. City of Slidell, 697 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 728 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), reh'g denied, 735 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)
(en bane), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985).
183. See Shelton v. City of College Station, 754 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985); Pirolo v. City of
Clearwater, 711 F.2d 1006 (1 1th Cir. 1983); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir.
1981).
184. See Bartholomew v. Fischl, 782 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown v. Reardon, 770 F.2d 896
(10th Cir. 1985); Williams v. Butler, 746 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1984).
185. See Zanghi v. Incorporated Village of Old Brookville, 752 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1985); Wise v.
Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328 (10th Cir. 1981); Norton v. Liddel, 620 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1980); McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1979).
186. Monell, 426 U.S. at 694; see, eg., Brown v. Reardon, 770 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1985) (if
alleged coercion on city employees did occur it was attributable to lower echelon employees and did
not reflect policy or custom); McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984) (sheriff's office is
liable for acts of constitutional deprivation carried out by sheriffwho is the official responsible for the
policies of the office); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980) (school board is liable
for requesting implementation of state statute, but county not liable for county judge's enforcement
of state law); Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980) (mayor is
the one city official whose edicts and acts represent municipal policy).
187. See, e.g., Grandstaffv. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985) (subsequent actions of
city officials deemed to establish unconstitutional policy); Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932 (4th
Cir. 1983) (plaintiff's failure to establish police pattern of excessive force was fatal to claim); Dunn v.
Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1982) (police officers found to be proper defendants in § 1983
action where no custom or policy governed), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1086 (1983).
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duct must have caused a constitutional violation, and the official policy or
custom must have been responsible for the misconduct. The most frequently
recurring example of this category is the police misconduct case, in which the

challenged policy or custom is inadequate training, supervision, or discipline. In
these cases the controlling issue frequently is whether and to what extent proof
of the particular incident of misconduct may be considered to establish the policy or custom of inadequate training, supervision, or discipline.188 In addition
to the problems of proof and the complex causation questions raised, the inadequate supervision or training cases have presented the issue whether a municipality's failure to train or supervise can form the basis of section 1983 municipal
liability as actionable nonfeasance. 18 9
Disparate results in policy or custom causation cases demonstrate that the
policy or custom requirement threatens the underlying purposes of section 1983.
Courts faced with police misconduct problems of inadequate training or supervision have looked to whether the inadequacy amounted to recklessness or gross
negligence, 190 or whether the municipality demonstrated deliberate indifference
to the constitutional rights of its citizens. 19 1 This focus on fault has serious
implications for the future of civil rights protection provided by section 1983.
The focus on fault clearly is at odds with the Supreme Court's consistent stance
that a section 1983 prima facie case requires the plaintiff to show only a constitutional violation by a person acting under color of state law. The Court never has
interpreted the statute to require a showing of fault; nor has it ever given any
indication that the case against a municipality differs in any essential respect
from the case against an individual actor. The addition of a requirement that
the plaintiff must plead and prove fault in certain types of section 1983 cases
creates unnecessary inconsistency and confusion. Worse, it has the potential for
frustrating the noble purpose of the statute's drafters-providing those deprived
188. See, e.g., Brown v. Reardon, 770 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff was unable to establish
pattern of official policy because he was the only employee who was terminated); Lopez v. City of
Austin, 710 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1983) (employee failed to show denial of his merit increase was based
on custom because it was an isolated incident); Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499 (5th Cir.
1980) (when complaint is silent, court will not infer that single act of slander constitutes city policy
or custom).
189. In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), a case involving the liability of supervisory personnel, the Court rather obliquely suggested that a failure to act cannot give rise to liability under
§ 1983. Id. at 371. However, the Monell Court's comment on Rizzo indicates that nonfeasance had
nothing to do with the conclusion. In a footnote in Monell the Court said, "By our decision in Rizzo
v. Goode, we would appear to have decided that the mere right to control without any control or
direction having been exercised and without any failure to supervise is not enough to support § 1983
liability." Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 n.58 (citation omitted). It can be inferred from this statement
that if a failure to supervise had been established, defendants in Rizzo would have been liable. Nevertheless, lower courts have continued to puzzle over whether a failure to train or supervise can
satisfy the policy or custom requirement. See Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1981);
Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982); Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980); see also Note, MunicipalLiability
Under Section 1983: The Failure to Act as "Custom or Policy", 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1225 (1983)
(discussing circumstances under which official inaction may rise to level of official policy or custom).
190. See, e.g., Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Kibbe v. City of
Springfield, 777 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1985); Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1982);
Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1980).
191. See, e.g., Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812 (Ist Cir. 1985); Doe v. New York City Dept. of
Social Services, 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1980).
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of civil liberties at the hands of government with an unobstructed path to
redress.
IV.

THE COURT ADDS DETAIL TO THE MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CANVAS

Since Monell the Court has addressed section 1983 municipal liability issues
in four significant cases. 192 Two of these cases dealt with the extent of municipal immunity1 93 and two dealt with the policy or custom requirement.
Although the Court has attempted to draw lines and add dimension to the
sketch of section 1983 municipal liability begun in Monell, the picture of municipal liability is still far from clear. The approach to judicial decisionmaking in
the two municipal immunity cases differs significantly from the approach taken
in Monell and the two cases addressing the policy or custom requirement.
Although the Court in Monell specifically refused to base section 1983 municipal liability on respondeatsuperior,the immunity cases illustrate the Court's recognition of concerns that would justify applying this theory in section 1983
municipal liability cases. 194 However, the cases attempting to clarify the meaning of the policy or custom requirement reassert that section 1983 municipal
liability cannot rest on respondeat superior.195 The confusion and doubt these
cases have created amply illustrate the difficulty the Court has had in conceptualizing its picture of section 1983 municipal liability. The result has been a distorted image of this aspect of the section 1983 action that could ultimately affect
the grand picture of constitutional protection envisioned by the drafters of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871.196

A. MunicipalImmunity-The Court Uses Both Broad Brush
And Narrowing Techniques
The Court made its first major addition to the section 1983 municipal liability picture in Owen v. City of Independence,197 in which it addressed the extent of municipal immunity.1 98 A comparison of the Court's approaches in
Monell and Owen reveals the inconsistency and confusion that have plagued section 1983 municipal liability. In Owen the chief of police brought a section 1983
action claiming that his dismissal without notice and an opportunity to be heard
violated his fourteenth amendment due process rights. Although the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed that the police chief's
constitutional rights had been violated, it concluded that all defendants, includ192. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808 (1985); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
193. Because the question whether municipalities should enjoy some kind of qualified immunity
was not presented in Monell, the Court specifically declined to address the scope of municipal immunity. Monell, 436 U.S. at 701.
194. See infra notes 197-247 and accompanying text.
195. See hifra notes 248-312 and accompanying text.
196. See hifra notes 263-312 and accompanying text.
197. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
198. Id. at 635-38.

1987]

SECTION 1983 MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

ing the city, were entitled to a qualified immunity. 199
The Supreme Court reversed and held that municipalities cannot assert

qualified immunity based on the good faith of their employees. 2°° In reaching
this conclusion the Court used the full range of available section 1983 judicial
decisionmaking criteria. The Court looked to the language of the statute,20 1 2its
03
legislative history, 20 2 the background of both historic and current tort law,

and public policy. 2° 4 Recognizing the scope of immunity issue as a problem of
statutory construction, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, began with an

examination of the statute itself. Finding no mention of "any privileges, immunities, or defenses that may be asserted,

20

5

he turned to the legislative history of

the Act in determining whether Congress intended municipalities to enjoy qualiof the debates discussfied immunity. Justice Brennan focused on those portions
20 6
ing the statute's broad scope and remedial character.
Although a cofisideration of the background of tort law was conspicuously
absent from the Court's respondeat superior holding in Monell, Justice Brennan

in Owen gave serious consideration to the common-law background of immunity
from tort liability. 20 7 Ie noted that the Court on several occasions had consid-

ered the immunity of state officials and had "found that a tradition of immunity
was so firmly rooted in the common law and was supported by such strong

policy reasons that 'Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished
to abolish the doctrine.' "208 After examining carefully the history of municipal
tort liability, 20 9 however, the majority found that "there is no tradition of immu199. Owen v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d 335, 338 (8th Cir.), rev'd, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
The court of appeals denied plaintiff relief against the city because the Supreme Court's decisions in
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972),
which established the right to a name clearing hearing, had not been handed down at the time the
incident in Owen occurred. The court of appeals concluded that the city should not be charged
"with predicting the future course of constitutional law" and extended the qualified immunity of the
individual defendants based on their good faith to the city as well. Owen, 589 F.2d at 338.
200. Owen, 445 U.S. at 638.
201. Id. at 635.
202. Id. at 650.
203. Id. at 637-38.
204. Id. at 651-52.
205. Id. at 635.
206. Id. at 636, 650.
207. See supranote 134. The Court traditionally had looked to the history of various immunities
in tort law in § 1983 immunity cases. See, eg., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
208. Owen, 445 U.S. at 637 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967)).
209. Id. at 638-50. The Court indicated that at the time Congress enacted § 1983, good faith
immunity did not exist for the actions contemplated by the statute. Id. at 640. Municipalities were
subject, as persons, to suits at common law just like corporations. The Court described the concerns
that were expressed during Congressional debates about the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Although some feared that immunity for individual actors would be abolished, there was no such
concern about municipalities. Thus, the Court reasoned: "Had there been a similar common-law
immunity for municipalities, the bill's opponents doubtless would have raised the specter of its destruction, as well." Id. at 643-44. The opinion next discussed the protection afforded a municipality
performing governmental functions. This protection was an extension of sovereign immunity by
which States are protected from suit. This immunity arose only if a state extended it to the municipality. However, "by the end of the 19th century, courts regularly held that in imposing a specific
duty on the municipality.., the State had impliedly withdrawn the city's immunity from liability for
the nonperformance or misperformance of its obligation." Id. at 646. Courts also attacked the final
protection for municipalities-immunity from suit for the exercise of discretionary functions. This
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nity for municipal corporations, and neither history nor policy supports a construction of § 1983 that would justify the qualified immunity accorded the
city."2 10 Finally, the majority concluded that policy considerations militated in
favor of denying municipalities the right to assert qualified immunities. The
Court noted that the reasons for affording state officers qualified immunity do
not apply to municipalities because payment is not made by the individual officer, but from the public treasury. 2 11 As a final justification, Justice Brennan
specifically noted the significant changes in tort law in the past century and
stated that "notions of governmental responsibility should properly reflect that

evolution.

'2 12

In particular, the Court recognized that notions of blameworthi-

ness are no longer the only consideration. Rather, "the principle of equitable

loss-spreading has joined fault as a factor in distributing the costs of official
3
misconduct.

'21

The holding in Owen that municipalities may not assert the good faith immunities of their officers clarified an important section 1983 municipal liability
issue and greatly broadened the statute's scope. The holding reiterated the
Court's position that fault is not part of a section 1983 prima facie case.2 14 The
immunity was limited by a distinction "that had the effect of subjecting the city to liability for much
of its tortious conduct." Id. at 649. Thus, "[w]hile the city retained its immunity for decisions as to
whether the public interest required acting in one manner or another, once any particular decision
was made, the city was fully liable for any injuries incurred in the execution of its judgment." Id.
The discretionary immunity kept courts from infringing on the coequal rights of another branch of
government. However, the Supreme Court concluded that "a municipality has no 'discretion' to
violate the Federal Constitution; its dictates are absolute and imperative." Id.
210. Id. at 638.
211. Id. at 652-54.
The Court earlier embraced qualified good faith immunity for individual government officials,
reasoning that "[s]uch an allocation would not only be 'manifestly unfair,' but would '[defy] this
Court's insistence in a related context that imposing personal liability in the absence of bad faith may
cause state officers to "exercise their discretion with undue timidity."' " Id. at 653 n.37 (quoting
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 699 n.32 (1978)). In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the
Court identified two reasons for the doctrine of official immunity:
(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer
who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with the
decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.
Id. at 240 (quoted in Owen, 445 U.S. at 654). A third consideration for extending immunity to
individuals was that the threat of personal liability would deter the most qualified citizens from
serving in public office. Owen, 445 U.S. at 654 n.38 (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320
(1975)). These considerations are not relevant to a municipality because damages must be paid from
public funds. The Court finds it necessary, therefore, to balance individual rights with preservation
of the public funds. It is more important that an individual be free to serve in a public capacity, so
that the most qualified will come forward without fear of personal loss, than to compensate the
victim of a tort resulting from the good faith actions of a public official. Conversely, the Court has
concluded, compensation to an innocent victim takes priority over the concern that tax revenues will
benefit an individual or discrete group. Id. at 654-55.
212. Owen, 445 U.S. at 657.
213. Id.
214. In Monroe the Court distinguished § 1983 from its criminal counterpart that contains the
word "willfully." The Court earlier had interpreted "willfully" to mean doing an act with "a specific
intent to deprive a person of a federal right," Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103 (1945), but
declined to put that gloss on § 1983 because it provided for civil rather than criminal liability.
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187. The Court clarified its position on the state of mind requirement in Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part,Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986), in which
it found that the § 1983 prima facie case requires only a showing of "(1) whether the conduct corn-
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existence of the right claimed by plaintiff in Owen was unknown at the time of
his discharge, so it could not be said that any government official intentionally
deprived plaintiff of his right or that those responsible for its invasion knew or
should have known that their conduct would invade that right. Thus, no issue
of fault existed with respect to the city or its employees. In fact, as the dissent
noted, after Owen municipalities are strictly liable under section 1983.215 However, despite the breadth of the Court's holding on the immunity issue in Owen,
that decision's impact is unlikely to be as great as critics and proponents have
predicted. Although the absence of immunity theoretically makes municipalities
more vulnerable to suit, the restrictive policy or custom requirement from Mo2 16
nell continues to limit greatly the potential for success.
In Owen the Court addressed only the immunity issue and had no occasion
217
to fill in the details of the actual causation requirement established in Monell.
In fact, the Court's only reference to the actual causation requirement was its
reaffirmation of the conclusion that a municipality is liable under section 1983
218
only for the execution of a government policy or custom that inflicts injury.
However, despite the fact the Court addressed different issues in the two cases, a
comparison of the reasoning used reveals inconsistencies. Nothing in Justice
Brennan's reasoning in Owen is inconsistent with a notion that section 1983 municipal liability should be based on respondeatsuperior. In fact, much of Justice
Brennan's opinion in favor of denying municipalities qualified immunity in
Owen could be used as a justification for basing liability on respondeat superior.
For example, Justice Brennan quoted a treatise on municipal corporations for
the proposition that " 'municipal corporationsproper ... are liable for acts of
misfeasance positively injurious to individuals, done by their authorized agents
or officers, in the course of the performance of corporate powers constitutionally
conferred, or in the execution of corporate duties.' "219 Justice Brennan's point
was that a strong tradition of municipal liability existed, but that no such history
supported a qualified municipal immunity. 220 Although Justice Brennan did not
intend to comment on municipal liability based on respondeatsuperior,his language clearly demonstrates a recognition that the municipal corporation was
liable for the tortious conduct of its agents or employees based on respondeat
superior.
plained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct
deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States." Id. at 535. Thus, the Court has specifically concluded that the statute contains no
independent state of mind requirement. The Court recently reaffirmed this position in Daniels v.
Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 663 (1986). For an argument that § 1983 imposes strict liability on those
causing constitutional invasions under color of state law, see Mead, supra note 37.
215. Owen, 445 U.S. at 658 (Powell, J., dissenting).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
217. The court of appeals had determined that the constitutional harm was caused by the official
conduct of the city's lawmakers and that the conduct amounted to official policy resulting in an
infringement of the petitioners' constitutional rights. Owen, 589 F.2d at 337. The Supreme Court
accepted that determination. Owen, 445 U.S. at 633.
218. Owen, 445 U.S. at 633.
219. Id. at 640 (quoting 2 J. DILLON, LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 764, at 875 (2d ed.
1873)).
220. Id. at 640-41.
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In addition, certain aspects of the approach to the immunity issue sound a
great deal like modern justifications for imposing vicarious liability on municipalities based on respondeatsuperior. The Owen Court noted, for example, that
denying municipalities the right to assert qualified immunities based on the good
faith of their officials creates incentives in officials "to err on the side of protecting citizens' constitutional rights ... [and encourages] those in a policymaking
position to institute internal rules and programs designed to minimize the likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitutional rights. ' 221 This logic is
strikingly similar to the accident reduction rationale posited for imposing liability on employers for the tortious activities of their employees. 222 Thus, it would
have been persuasive in the section 1983 context as reason to impose municipal
liability based on respondeat superior.
The Court in Owen specifically approved the idea of "equitable loss spreading" as a justification for denying municipal immunity, finding "it is fairer to
allocate any resulting financial loss to the inevitable costs of government borne
by all the taxpayers, than to allow its impact to be felt solely by those whose
rights, albeit newly recognized, have been violated. '223 Like the accident reduction rationale, the equitable loss spreading theory has been used persuasively as a
justification for holding a blameless employer liable for the tortious acts of employees. 224 Justice Brennan's recognition in Owen of the fairness rationale and
the accident reduction rationale might have been used just as effectively in Monell to justify liability based on respondeat superior. Justice Brennan rejected
both rationales in Monell, however, simply because the Court concluded that
Congress had intended to reject all forms of vicarious liability in section 1983.225
Justice Brennan attempted to justify the apparent conflict between the two decisions on causation grounds, stating in a footnote that "when it is the local government itself that is responsible for the constitutional deprivation . . . it is

perfectly reasonable to distribute the loss to the public as a cost of the adminis226
tration of government."

The merit of this distinction is questionable. It has already been suggested
that the Monell Court's conclusion based on its interpretation of the legislative
history was erroneous. 227 If the Court misinterpreted Congressional intent to
reject respondeatsuperior from Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment,
then the accident reduction and equitable loss spreading rationales should have
carried more weight. The Owen Court's recognition of the goal of compensating
"[t]he innocent individual who is harmed by an abuse of governmental authority" 22 8 has the ring of a policy argument in favor of a respondeat superior the221. Id. at 652.
222. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 63, § 69, at 500-01; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AoirNcY § 216 comment a, § 1 comment on subsection (1)a (1958).
223. Owen, 445 U.S. at 655.
224. See, e.g., Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 139-41 (Alaska 1972); Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 618, 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 148 (1975).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
226. Owen, 445 U.S. at 655 n.39.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
228. Owen, 445 U.S. at 657.
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If compensation to innocent victims is a primary goal of section 1983,230

it is specious to distinguish between an innocent injured plaintiff who cannot
recover because the municipal actor responsible for the harm has a good faith
defense and the plaintiff who cannot recover because the municipal actor cannot
be identified or is judgment proof. In both situations an abuse of governmental

authority has harmed the plaintiff and in both situations the governmental unit
should accept responsibility for compensating the victim. A contrary result conflicts with section 1983's broad remedial purpose and threatens to restrict unnecessarily the section 1983 action against municipalities.

Any thought that the municipal immunity holdings in Monell and Owen
evidenced a general trend toward an expansive judicial approach to section 1983
municipal liability was soon laid to rest in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,

Inc.,231 decided the year after Owen. Plaintiffs in Fact Concerts sued for compensatory and punitive damages for invasions of their first amendment rights

when the city cancelled a license to present a concert. 232 At trial the court gave
an instruction permitting the jury to award punitive damages against the city

and the jury returned a verdict that included an award of punitive damages. The
233
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether a municipality
may be held liable for punitive damages under section 1983.234 In reaching its
conclusion that municipalities should be immune from punitive damages, the
229. See supra note 126.
230. The Supreme Court has specifically stated that compensation for constitutional injury is a
primary goal of § 1983. See, eg., Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978).
231. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
232. Fact Concerts, Inc., was a Rhode Island corporation that promoted musical concerts. During 1975 Fact Concerts contracted with the City of Newport to present a series of jazz concerts.
After a cancellation by one performer, Fact Concerts hired Blood, Sweat, and Tears to appear in
concerts scheduled for August 30 and 31. The city objected, calling Blood, Sweat, and Tears a
"rock" group and expressed concern that a "rowdy" crowd would attend those concerts. Fact Concerts was told to drop Blood, Sweat, and Tears from the concert. When they did not, the city
council voted to revoke the license and prohibit the concert on the grounds that Fact Concerts had
failed to live up to all parts of the agreement, alleging that spectator seats had not been wired together and an auxiliary generator was not in place. The city's revocation and cancellation were
widely announced in the local media. Fact Concerts obtained a restraining order in state court and
the concerts took place although fewer than half of the available tickets were sold. Fact Concerts,
453 U.S. at 249-52.
233. Fact Concerts brought suit in federal court seeking compensatory and punitive damages
based on § 1983 and state tort law grounds. At the end of the trial the jury was charged with an
instruction that included its ability to levy punitive damages. The city did not object to the instruction. The jury returned a verdict for Fact Concerts and assessed both compensatory and punitive
damages against the city and seven officials. The city moved for a new trial and raised for the first
time an objection to the punitive damages award. The district court noted that the challenge was
untimely under FED. R. Civ. P. 51, but nevertheless rendered a decision on the merits of the challenge, approving the assessment of punitive damages against a municipality. Fact Concerts,453 U.S.
at 252-54. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, noting that the city's
challenge was "flawed" by its failure to object at trial and that the failure would not be overlooked
because there was no "plain error" present that would have affected the result of the trial. Fact
Concerts, Inc. v. City of Newport, 626 F.2d 1060, 1067 (Ist Cir. 1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
The court of appeals also indicated that punitive damages might be appropriate against municipalities. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and declined to be bound by the application of rule
51's "plain error" rule on the basis that the district court had reached the merits of the challenge and
a review of that decision was properly before the Court. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 255-57.
234. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 249.
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Court focused on considerations of history and policy. 23 5 Noting its assumption
that the members of the forty-second Congress were familiar with common-law
tort principles existing at the time and intended them to obtain unless specifically stated otherwise, 2 36 the Court looked to whether municipalities tradition-

ally had been immune from punitive damages. Thus, to determine legislative
intent on this issue, the Court looked once again to the historical context of the

Act.2 37 It found in its examination of the precedents a strong common-law tradition of "Dj]udicial disinclination to award punitive damages against a municipality."'2 38 As additional support for its conclusion, the Court pointed out that

the Sherman Amendment would have required municipalities found liable "to
pay full compensation."'2 39 From this historical fact, the Court inferred that

Congress had not intended municipalities found liable under section 1983 to pay
punitive damages. 24 ° In addition, the Court found evidence in the legislative
history that at least some members of Congress were concerned with the financial burdens the Sherman Amendment would have imposed on local govern-

ments.2 4 1 The Sherman Amendment would have allowed for compensatory
damages only, but the Court concluded that Congress' concern with the burden
on local governments and innocent taxpayers would have applied to punitive
damages as well.

After finding no indication that Congress intended to deviate from the wellestablished principle of municipal immunity from punitive damages, the Court

turned to considerations of policy to determine whether a contrary result might
be dictated.2 42 The Court concluded that none of the policies behind punitive

damages or the section 1983 remedies would be advanced by imposing punitive
damages on a municipality.2 43 The Court decided that although municipalities

are "persons" for purposes of suit under section 1983, they are incapable of the
malice necessary to justify the imposition of punitive damages. The Court also
found that a governmental entity cannot be punished effectively by the payment
235. Id. at 258-59.
236. Id. at 258.
237. Id. at 263-66. Although the Court often looks to historical context for indications of legislative intent in the absence of express statements in the statute, its use of this factor seems to be
selective. Compare Owen, 445 U.S. at 635-50 and Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967)
(Court looked to historical context in deciding whether Congress intended to abrogate common-law
immunities) with Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-95 (Court failed to look to historical context to see
whether Congress intended to impose liability based on respondeat superior).
238. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 260-63. The Court looked to decisions in state courts that had
denied recovery of punitive damages from municipalities. Two themes emerged from those cases.
First, a municipality "'cannot, as such, do a criminal act or a willful and malicious wrong.'" Id. at
261 (quoting Hunt v. City of Booneville, 65 Mo. 620, 624 (1877)). The second theme was that
"courts viewed punitive damages as contrary to sound public policy, because such awards would
burden the very taxpayers and citizens for whose benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised." Id. at
263.
239. Id. at 264.
240. Id. at 264-65.
241. Id. at 265.
242. Although the Court generally has used considerations of policy in § 1983 cases to buttress
its conclusions on legislative intent, it suggested in Fact Concerts that policy considerations might
override its conclusions on intent drawn from an examination of historical context. Id. at 266.
243. Id. at 268-71.
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of punitive damages. To the extent anyone suffers, it is the innocent taxpayer.
The Court concluded that the possibility of obtaining punitive damages from
those representatives of the municipality actually responsible for the harm suffi44
ciently furthers the deterrence and punitive functions of section 1983.2
The Court's purpose in Fact Concerts was to settle the punitive damages
issue in section 1983 municipal liability. Like the Owen Court, it had no occasion to address the policy or custom requirement and did not comment on the
Monell rejection of respondeat superior. Unlike the holding in Owen, however,
the holding in Fact Concerts constricts rather than broadens the reach of municipal liability. Therefore, the Court did not need to extend justifications like accident reduction and loss spreading. Reading between the lines of the majority
opinion in Fact Concerts, however, it is possible to find support for a respondeat
superior theory of section 1983 municipal liability. Precedent the Court relied
on for the proposition that municipalities should be immune from punitive dam2 45
ages indicates a clear recognition that municipalities themselves do not act.
The Court's failure to acknowledge this fact in Monell was an important factor
24 6
in its rejection of respondeat superior.
In addition, the Court's approach in Fact Concerts to determining legislative intent further supports the position that the Monell Court took the wrong
approach. In Monell the Court, without looking to whether a common-law tradition of imposing liability on municipalities based on respondeat superior existed, refused to infer from legislative silence the intent to impose liability based
on respondeatsuperior. The Court in Fact Concerts made an extensive examination of the common-law tradition of providing municipal immunity against payment of punitive damages. If the Court had made the same kind of examination
in Monell of the common-law tradition of basing municipal liability on respondeat superior,it arguably would have found that Congress intended the basis of
section 1983 municipal liability to be respondeat superior. Furthermore, the
Court's acknowledgement that historically it was well understood that the community should share the obligation to compensate 24 7 has the modem ring of the
cost spreading justification for imposing liability on employers based on respondeat superior.
The two major section 1983 municipal immunity cases after Monell have
added substance to at least one important aspect of the section 1983 municipal
liability picture. It is now clear that municipalities may not assert qualified immunities that might be available to their officers and that municipalities may not
be assessed punitive damages. Given much of the language and reasoning in
Owen and Fact Concerts, however, it is not so clear why the Court concluded in
244. Id. at 269-70.
245. The Court cited an 1877 Missouri case for the proposition that punitive damages should not
be imposed on municipalities because they "can not, as such, do a criminal act or a willful and
malicious wrong." Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 261 (citing Hunt v. City of Booneville, 65 Mo. 620
(1877)).
246. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
247. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 259-63.
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Monell and continues to assert that section 1983 municipal liability should not
be based on respondeatsuperior.
B. The Policy or Custom Requirement-The Distortion Takes
an Alarming Shape
To shed light on some of the persistent inconsistencies that still obscure the
section 1983 municipal liability picture, the Supreme Court recently has addressed the policy or custom requirement in two significant cases. In a police
misconduct case, City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,2 4 8 the Court examined the
question whether a plaintiff can use proof of a single incident of misconduct to
establish a municipal policy or custom of inadequate training or supervision sufficient to render the municipality liable under section 1983.249 The issue in
Pembaurv. City of Cincinnati250 was whether and under what circumstances a
decision by municipal policymakers on a single occasion will satisfy the policy or
custom requirement. 25 1 Although these cases purported to clarify the section
1983 municipal liability picture, a close analysis reveals that they cloud more
issues than they resolve. Furthermore, these cases amply illustrate the problems
raised by the Court's refusal in Monell to impose liability based on respondeat
superior.
Plaintiff in Tuttle, widow of a man killed by a gunshot wound inflicted by a
police officer, introduced expert testimony that the officer had been inadequately
trained, but she offered no evidence that the particular officer or any other officer
had been involved in similar incidents.2 52 At trial the jury was instructed that it
could infer from "a single unusually excessive use of force.., that it was attributable to inadequate training or supervision amounting to 'deliberate indifference'
or 'gross negligence' on the part of the officials in charge. ' 253 The jury returned
a verdict against the city, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
254
Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court by a majority of seven reversed, concluding that the
instruction was erroneous and that proof of a single incident of misconduct
standing alone is insufficient to establish municipal liability. 255 Justice (now
Chief Justice) Rehnquist, in reviewing the development of section 1983 municipal liability, noted the Monell Court's adoption of the policy or custom requirement and that Court's use of legislative history to support its rejection of
respondeat superior.256 Justice Rehnquist concluded that to impose liability
based solely on proof of a single incident would be "to impose it simply because
248. 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
249. Id.at 813-14.
250. 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986).
251. Id. at 1298.
252. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 821-12.

253. Id. at 813.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 824-25.
256. Id. at 818.
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the municipality hired one 'bad apple.' "257
In addition to rendering this narrow holding, Justice Rehnquist, speaking
only for a plurality, addressed the more general question of what constitutes
municipal policy and what proof is required to establish a policy or custom of
inadequate training. In his remarks, most of which must be classified as dicta,

Justice Rehnquist attempted to shed some light on the elusive concept of "pol2 58
icy." Because the word policy is a requirement of the Court's own making,
the traditional approach of statutory interpretation was unavailable. The plurality looked instead to the dictionary to find a definition of policy, 2 59 concluding

that "the word 'policy' generally implies a course of action consciously chosen
from among various alternatives.

' 260

In addition, the plurality drew a distinc-

tion between "unconstitutional policies" and "policies that are not themselves
unconstitutional,

' 261

finding that to establish liability for the latter requires

"considerably more proof than the single incident." 2 62

Both the tentative attempt at defining policy and distinguishing between

constitutional and unconstitutional policies have serious implications for the future of section 1983 municipal liability. As the plurality pointed out, if policy
connotes conscious choice of alternatives, it is hard to conceptualize pursuing a

policy of inadequate training or supervision. Although this would not preclude
approaching the inadequate training or supervision problem as a matter of gov-

ernmental custom, a "custom" approach would require proof of a pervasive pattern of the inadequacy of the training and of incidents resulting from it.

More portentous, however, is the question the plurality raised but failed to
answer-whether a policy not in itself unconstitutional "can ever meet the 'pol-

icy' requirement of Monell.' '2 63 If the Court ultimately should conclude that
such a policy does nor meet the Monell requirement, a large segment of section

1983 municipal liability will be eradicated. The existence of a policy or custom
of inadequate police training or supervision is not in itself unconstitutional even
257. Id. at 821.
258. Although the Court developed the policy or custom requirement as a way to implement the
§ 1983 causation requirement in municipal liability cases, it is not a requirement that can be found in
the statute. This fact is aptly pointed out by Justice Stevens in his separate opinion in Tuttle, 471
U.S. at 841-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and in his opinion in Pembaur,106 S.Ct. at 1302 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
259. The Court quoted a dictionary defining policy as "'adefinite course or method of action
selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and
future decisions.'" Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823 n.6 (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 910 (1983)).

260. Id. at 823.
261. Id. at 823-24. Prior to Tuttle the Supreme Court had not specifically recognized this distinction. In fact, in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), the Court stated that the § 1983
plaintiff had failed to allege that his claimed deprivation "was caused by any constitutionally forbidden rule or procedure," thus suggesting that the rule or procedure challenged causing the deprivation must itself be unconstitutional. Id. at 326. In a footnote in Tuttle, the Court cast doubt on the
continued validity of basing § 1983 municipal liability on inadequate supervision or training, stating:
"We express no opinion on whether a policy that itself is not unconstitutional, such as the general
'inadequate training' alleged here, can ever meet the 'policy' requirement of Monell." Tuttle, 471
U.S. at 824 n.7.
262. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824.
263. Id. at 824 n.7.
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though much police misconduct resulting in constitutional violations can be attributed to it. In fact, very little police misconduct results from consciously
chosen policies that are themselves unconstitutional. If the Court continues its
restrictive interpretation of the word policy and ultimately concludes that policies not in themselves unconstitutional cannot constitute a basis for section 1983
municipal liability, Congress' expansive intent in creating the section 1983 remedies will be frustrated. Inadequate training or supervision creates a tremendous
potential for unconstitutional behavior. A municipality creating such a risk
through inadequate procedures should bear the cost of compensation when the
risk becomes a reality.
The Court's concept of policy is not the only troubling aspect of the Tuttle
decision. The plurality's focus on fault as an aspect of the section 1983 municipal liability case poses an even greater threat to protection of civil liberties. The
Tuttle plurality's approach to the Monell policy or custom requirement adds a
detail to the section 1983 municipal liability picture that the majority in Monell
did not intend. The Monell majority imposed the policy or custom requirement
to ensure that municipalities would not be liable for constitutional invasions they
had not actually caused. The Tuttle plurality, however, concluded that the Monell policy or custom requirement "provides a fault-based analysis for imposing
municipal liability. '' 264 In distinguishing the policy or custom causation requirement from respondeat superior, the Court stated that "municipal liability
should not be imposed when the municipality was not itself at fault. '265 The
Court also stated that the policy or custom requirement "was intended to prevent the imposition of municipal liability under circumstances where no wrong
could be ascribed to municipal decisionmakers. '266 Again, in commenting on
the amount of proof necessary if the policy is not itself unconstitutional, the
plurality stated that such cases would require "considerably more proof than the
single incident ...to establish both the requisitefault on the part of the municipality, and the causal connection between the policy and the constitutional
'267
deprivation.
Furthermore, the Court in a footnote noted, "[I]t is open to question
whether a policymaker's 'gross negligence' in establishing police training practices could establish a 'policy' that constitutes a 'moving force' behind subsequent unconstitutional conduct, or whether a more conscious decision on the
part of the policymaker would be required. '268 Thus, the plurality opinion
raises the disturbing possibility that the Court ultimately may require that the
section 1983 plaintiff establish actual intent or state of mind amounting to delib269
erate disregard for constitutional rights.
264. Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
265. Id. (emphasis added).
266, Id. at 821 (emphasis added).
267. Id. at 824 (emphasis added).
268, Id. at 824 n.7.
269, The Court has granted certiorari in a case in which it could decide this issue. See Kibbe v.
City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1374 (1986). Kibbe is
discussed infra note 276.
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Justice Rehnquist and the plurality were not alone in their focus on fault.
Justice Brennan, author of the Monell policy and custom requirement, concurred in the judgment in Tuttle but found that the plurality's approach "need2 70
lessly complicated" municipal liability and "unsettled more than it clarified."
However, although purporting to address the case as a problem of proof of causation, 27 1 and recognizing that a cause of action under the statute requires only
proof "that (1) a person (2) acting under color of state law (3) subjected the
plaintiff or caused the plaintiff to be subjected (4) to the deprivation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States," 272 he also consistently
273
framed his references to the policy and custom requirement in terms of fault.
Justice Brennan even interpreted his own opinion in Monell to be a rejection of
respondeat superior because "such liability would violate the evident Congressional intent to preclude municipal liability in cases in which the city itself was
not atfault. '274 This interpretation ignores the fact the Monell policy or custom
requirement relates only to causation.
The Tuttle Court did not directly address whether fault is a necessary part
of section 1983 municipal liability cases, so it is difficult to assess the import of
the Court's focus on fault. One possible explanation is that several members of
the Court simply have misunderstood the nature of the policy or custom requirement. The Court's concern in Monell was clearly with the causation language in
the statute and its conclusion that Congress intended to exclude all forms of
vicarious liability. There is not the slightest hint in Monell that section 1983
municipal liability should be based on fault. Nor is there any suggestion in the
statute or its legislative history to indicate that Congress intended municipalities, or any other section 1983 "persons," to be liable only when plaintiffs can
establish fault. Furthermore, the Court made clear by its holding in Owen that a
municipality is liable even if the municipality could not have known that its
policy or custom would result in a constitutional harm. Thus, fault could not be
an aspect of the section 1983 municipal liability case.
There are several possible explanations for the Court's focus on fault. Perhaps the Court has misunderstood the distinction between basing liability on
respondeatsuperiorand basing it on actual causation. 2 75 The Monell Court concluded that respondeatsuperioris inconsistent with the causation language of the
270. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 825 (Brennan, J., concurring).
271. In Justice Brennan's opinion, causation in a § 1983 municipal liability case is divided into
two parts. First, the plaintiff must show that the city itself caused the harm by establishing the
existence of an official policy or established custom such as training procedures. Second, the plaintiff
must show that the policy or custom caused the constitutional deprivation. Id. at 829-30 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
272. Id. at 829 (Brennan, J., concurring).
273. Id. at 830-31 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan's focus on the fault concept pervaded his whole opinion. Justice Brennan wrote that the single incident of "outrageous" police
misbehavior was insufficient to establish that the municipality was "at fault" for the constitutional
violation. Id. at 831 (Brennan, J., concurring). "[W]ithout some evidence of municipal policy or
custom independent of the police officer's misconduct, there is no way of knowing whether the city is
atfault." Id. (emphasis added).
274. Id. at 828 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
275. But see supra text accompanying notes 108-10 (arguing that actual causation need not be
viewed as inconsistent with respondeat superior).
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statute so it devised the policy or custom causation requirement. However, the
rejection of respondeat superior does not necessarily mean a fault element was
added. To say that a governmental policy or custom has caused constitutional
injury does not necessarily mean that the government was at fault for having
allowed it. It is possible the Court has confused the concept of accepting legal
responsibility for having created a risk of a harm with the concept of having
been at fault for having created a risk of harm.
Another possibility is that the Court actually intended to change the content of the section 1983 prima facie case by establishing fault as a new element of
section 1983 municipal liability-at least in police misconduct cases. If so, in
addition to establishing the requisite causation, the plaintiff apparently must
plead and prove that the objectionable policy came about as a result of faultprobably gross negligence or deliberate indifference-on the part of policymakers. 276 If this is the correct interpretation of the Court's focus on fault, it marks
a distinct departure from the Court's previous approaches to the requirements of
the section 1983 prima facie case. The Court never has interpreted the statute to
include a fault requirement. In fact, ever since the Court in Monroe specifically
rejected a specific intent requirement, the Court has steadfastly held to its position that a section 1983 plaintiff need only plead and prove that 277
the defendant
acting under color of state law caused a constitutional violation.
Furthermore, the addition of a fault requirement conflicts with the fortysecond Congress' intent to provide constitutional remedies of tremendous scope
in section 1983. To require section 1983 plaintiffs to plead and prove fault
would seriously constrict the reach of those remedies. Constitutional injury may
occur under color of state law even if no one is technically "at fault" in the sense
of having intentionally or negligently caused the harm. In the police misconduct
cases it is likely that inadequacies of training or supervision are attributable to
someone's fault. However, under a policy or custom causation approach the
focus should be on the inadequacies, not on the question whether anyone was at
fault in creating those inadequacies. The insistence on the policy or custom requirement in a police misconduct case invites a focus on fault. "Negligent su276. Even this showing may not suffice. In a footnote, the Tuttle plurality stated:
We express no opinion on whether a policy that itself is not unconstitutional, such as the
general "inadequate training" alleged here, can ever meet the "policy" requirement of Monell. In addition, even assuming that such a "policy" would suffice, it is open to question
whether a policymaker's "gross negligence" in establishing police training practices could
establish a "policy" that constitutes a "moving force" behind subsequent unconstitutional
conduct, or whether a more conscious decision on the part of the policymaker would be
required.

Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824 n.7.
It is likely that the Supreme Court will address this issue in Kibbe v. City of Springfield. In
Kibbe the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit sustained a jury verdict on the basis
that the jury could have found from the evidence that the police department's gross negligence in
training was the cause of the constitutional deprivation claimed. Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777
F.2d 801, 809 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1374 (1986).
277. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664 (1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,
535 (1980), overruled in part, Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986). For a discussion of
Monroe, see supra text accompanying notes 33-67.
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pervision" is a well-established common-law tort concept, 278 so it is not
surprising that courts faced with a purported policy of inadequate training or
supervision inject a fault element. An easy way to avoid this problem would be
to eliminate the policy or custom requirement in favor of imposing section 1983
municipal liability based on respondeat superior. Absent that approach, however, it is critical that the Supreme Court clarify its position with regard to fault
and reassert its consistent conclusion that the section 1983 case requires only
proof of a constitutional violation caused by one acting -under color of state law
and that the policy or custom requirement relates only to causation.
It is difficult to judge the impact the Tuttle decision will have on section
1983 municipal liability cases. The actual holding in the case settled only the

narrow question whether proof of a single incident of misconduct is sufficient to
establish a policy or custom of inadequate training or supervision. Most lower

courts faced with the issue already had resolved it consistently with the Tuttle
result. 279 The major impact of Tuttle will be the plurality's approach to "pol-

icy" and its focus on fault. Although falling short of actually defining "policy,"

Tuttle indicated that policy requires a conscious choice from among alternatives.

How much and what kind of proof will be sufficient to establish a policy of
inadequate training is still an open question despite the Tuttle plurality's attempt

at guidance. Presumably, to establish a "policy" of inadequate training or supervision, the plaintiff must prove that municipal policy makers deliberately
chose to pursue a course of inadequate training or supervision. 2 80 Because the
Tuttle Court failed to specify or quantify the proof necessary, it is likely that

significant confusion will arise concerning what kind of evidence is appropriate
and how much evidence is sufficient. 28 1 The Tuttle plurality's greatest impact
278. Negligent supervision and the closely related concept of negligent entrustment of dangerous
instrumentalities to those unable to handle them safely have arisen most often in the area of torts
committed by children. See 2 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 109, § 8.13, at 599-603; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 63, § 33, at 197-203.
279. See, eg., Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936-37 (4th Cir. 1983); Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220, 228-30 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).
280. Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("To succeed, a plaintiff
must show a course deliberately pursued by the city .... ").
281. In Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the district court had
permitted plaintiffs to introduce a broad range of evidence to try to prove their case against the
municipal actors. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the admission of much of the evidence by the district court in an "'unrestrained manner"
constituted reversible error, notwithstanding the fact the district court had directed verdicts in favor
of the city and the chief of police. Id. at 122, 133.
However, the court of appeals continued, stating, "We recognize that the § 1983 case against
the District that the plaintiffs stated and attempted to prove required a showing that the municipality was both on notice of and indifferent to widespread police brutality." Id. at 133. Earlier, the
court noted:
Plaintiffs presented evidence that sought to demonstrate: (I) misconduct similar to
the events in suit so widespread that it would not have persisted without the city's tacit
approval; (2) the unfamiliarity of top officials with complaints lodged against police force
members, indicating the city's lack of concern with the constitutional rights of persons who
encounter police officers in the District; and (3) the inadequate response accorded to complaints of police misconduct, which signaled to police officers that their misbehavior would
not be treated by the city as a matter of large concern.
Id. at 122.
Plaintiffs in Carter attempted to prove "custom or policy" by introducing, "inter alia, bare
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certainly will be its interpolation of a fault element in police misconduct cases.

Even if the Court did not intend to impose a fault requirement in Tuttle, it is
282
already apparent that lower federal courts are applying the fault approach.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit already
has interpreted Tuttle and Monell as subjecting municipalities to liability "not
'based on theories akin to respondeatsuperior' but on 'a fault based analysis' "283
and approved an instruction that a plaintiff must "show fault on the part of the
'284
city based on a course its policymakers consciously chose to pursue."
This kind of interpretation could have dire consequences. To inject a fault

element into the concept of policy or custom greatly adds to the plaintiff's bur-

den in a section 1983 case. Proof of fault in establishing policy in a police misconduct case will be difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. Furthermore, it
complicates the issues in cases that already are complex and confusing.
complaints, pleadings, and press clippings, unsubstantiated by testimony, concerning alleged incidents of the use of excessive force by police officers." Id. at 123. Plaintiffs could prove only six
occurrences:
(1) the testimony of witness Craig Scott that in May 1982, police officers beat him repeatedly both at the scene of his arrest and after taking him into custody; (2) the death of
prisoner Darrell Rhones in police custody in December 1983, and the D.C. Medical Examiner's conclusion that the death was caused by a "choke-hold" administered by police officers; (3) the death of seven persons, acknowledged by Police Chief Turner, in incidents
involving D.C. police in a two-month period in late 1983 and early 1984; (4) a fine imposed
against officer Vanderbloemen for striking two persons without cause, and improperly arresting one of them; (5) the reprimand of officer Markovich for looping a belt around the
neck of a prisoner and taunting him and; (6) the police chief's admission that officer Anderson had kicked a handcuffed suspect.
Id. (citations to record omitted).
This litany was contrasted with the evidence presented in Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d
1220 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded,735 F.2d 838 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (en banc), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 739 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (en banc). In Webster a teenage
auto theft suspect was shot in the head by one of the arresting officers after he emerged from the van
unarmed and with his hands raised. The officer put down a "throwdown" gun beside the mortally
wounded youth so that it would make the shooting appear justifiable. None of the other officers
came forward with the truth until a federal investigation was initiated at the insistence of the boy's
family. The policy or custom showing in Webster was based on evidence that "75-80% of the municipality's officers ...carried 'throw down' guns." Webster, 689 F.2d at 1222. The court of appeals in
Carterstated that it did not suggest by its reference to Webster that a numerical standard would be
determinative. "Egregious instances of misconduct, relatively few in number but following a common design, may support an inference that the instances would not occur but for municipal tolerance of the practice in question." Carter, 795 F.2d at 124. This "common design" was found
lacking in plaintiffs' case. Id.
The court of appeals in Carter also rejected evidence that top police officials were unfamiliar
with and gave inadequate attention to complaints by the public. Id. at 124-25. Finally, the court did
not disagree with the admission of unsubstantiated hearsay from newspapers, personnel files, and
other sources about allegations of police misconduct, but found reversible error based on the risk of
prejudice to particular police defendants who were mentioned by name as having been involved in
prior incidents. Id. at 126-31. From all that was presented the court of appeals determined that
there was insufficient proof of the existence of an official policy or custom of tolerance or approval of
abusive police conduct by the city or the police chief. Id. at 124. However, the manner in which the
evidence was introduced was found to be an abuse of the trial court's discretion and the court of
appeals required that a new trial be granted for the individual defendants. Id. at 132. Carter,therefore, leaves unanswered the question how much and what type of proof is necessary to show the
requisite "custom or policy" for establishing § 1983 liability.
282. See Carter, 795 F.2d at 122.
283. Id. (quoting Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 818).
284. Id.
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In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati2 85 the Supreme Court addressed the policy and custom requirement in a different factual context from the one encountered in Tuttle. Although the case involved the appropriateness of the conduct
of law enforcement personnel, it was not a typical police misconduct case.
Rather, Pembaur raised the question whether law enforcement personnel were
implementing official policy at the time the constitutional injury occurred. In
Pembaurcounty deputy sheriffs and municipal police officers, acting on instructions from the county prosecutor to "go in and get" witnesses, broke down the
door of plaintiff's office. Plaintiff sued the city and county under section 1983,
claiming fourth and fourteenth amendment violations. 286 The district court dismissed the claims against the city and county, concluding that the officers were
not acting pursuant to a Monell official policy. The United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint against the
city of Cincinnati, but affirmed the dismissal of the complaint against the
county. 2 87 Although it found the sheriff and prosecutor to be officials authorized to establish official policy, the court concluded that evidence of one occa-

sion in which the officials decided to force an entry in violation of the fourth
288
amendment was insufficient to establish an official policy.

The Supreme Court reversed and in doing so addressed "whether, and in
what circumstances, a decision by municipal policymakers on a single occasion
may satisfy [the official policy] requirement. ' 289 Justice Brennan, once again
writing for the majority, 290 used the Monell policy requirement as the starting
'291
point for his analysis. Noting that "Monell is a case about responsibility,
Justice Brennan attempted to clarify the Monell "official policy" requirement by
stating that it was "intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of
employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is
285. 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986).
286. Id. at 1295.
287. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 746 F.2d 337, 342 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1292
(1986).
288. Id. at 341.
289. Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1294.
290. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court for part I, which contained the facts,
procedural history, and reasons for granting certiorari; in part IIA, he delivered an analysis of Monell and the background of municipal liability under § 1983. He was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor. In part IIB the Court limited the liability for
municipalities to those situations in which the decisionmaker possesses final authority with respect to
the action ordered. The Court limited liability to those instances "where-and only where-a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or
officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question." Id. at
1300. This portion of the opinion represented a plurality view, with only Justices White, Marshall,
and Blackmun joining Justice Brennan. In part IIC the Court applied the municipal liability test to
the facts in Pembaur and determined that liability for a single incident could be found under § 1983.
Justice Brennan was again joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens in part IIC.
Justice White filed a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 1301 (White, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also filed a separate opinion. Id. at 1302 (Stevens, J.concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Justice O'Connor filed a separate opinion. Id. at 1304 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist in filing a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1304 (Powell, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 1297.
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limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible. ' 292 It is
immediately obvious that Justice Brennan's approach in Pembauris significantly

different from his approach in Tuttle. In his concurring opinion in Tuttle, Justice Brennan emphasized fault as the basis of municipal liability;293 by contrast,
in Pembaur he stressed responsibility.2 94 Municipal responsibility is limited to
circumstances in which it can be established that the municipality has acted to

cause the harm. 295 Thus, once again the focus clearly is on causation and away
from fault.
From the determination that municipal acts form the basis of municipal

liability, Justice Brennan concluded that a single decision by a municipal policymaker may be sufficient to satisfy this requirement. 296 In reaching this result,
Justice Brennan attempted to clarify the concept of official policy, declaring that,
though "'official policy' often refers to formal rules or understanding

. . .

in-

tended to... establish fixed plans of action to be followed under similar circumstances consistently and over time,... a government frequently chooses a course

of action tailored to a particular situation and not intended to control decisions
in later situations.

'297

Justice Brennan concluded that if such a decision is made

by an authorized policymaker, then it is "an act of official government 'policy' as
g
2 98
that term is commonly understood.

Justice Brennan's approach has significantly enlarged the concept of official
policy articulated in Monell and Tuttle. The majority in Monell implied that
official policy exists only after some kind of formal decision has been made by

officials in policymaking positions. 299 The plurality in Tuttle reaffirmed this
view and also indicated that the plaintiff must establish that his or her injury

resulted from an already existing policy. 300 Like the Tuttle plurality, the majority in Pembaurlooked to the dictionary for the meaning of "policy" but found a
definition with more substance. 30 t The Court's dictionary research revealed
292. Id. at 1298.
293. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 830-31 (Brennan, J., concurring).
294. Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1298-99.
295. Id. at 1297-98.
296. Id. at 1298.
297. Id. at 1299.
298. Id.
299. In Monell the Court stated that municipal liability attaches when "the action that is alleged
to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
300. In Tuttle the plurality stated: "Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not
sufficient to impose liability under Monell unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was
caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker." Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24.
301. In fact, the Pembaur majority used a number of sources in its search for a definition of
"policy." It collected its findings in a footnote:
While the dictionary is not the source definitively to resolve legal questions, we note that
this description of "policy" is consistent with the word's ordinary definition. For example,
Webster's defines the word as "a specific decision or set of decisions designed to carry out
such a chosen course of action." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1754
(1981). Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines "policy" as "[a] course of action
adopted and pursued by a government, party, ruler, statesman, etc.; any course of action
adopted as advantageous or expedient." VII Oxford English Dictionary 1071 (1933). See
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that official policy is not necessarily a final rule of general applicability; nor is it
necessary that the plaintiff establish that an already existing policy caused the
injury. Policy can be made on the spot and have applicability only to the particular situation in which the constitutional violation occurs by an authorized decisionmaker. 30 2 The determination that "where action is directed by those who
establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible whether
that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly" 30 3 naturally raises
the question of how to determine which decisions by which municipal officers
constitute "official policy." Speaking to that issue, Justice Brennan concluded
that "[m]unicipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final
3° 4
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered."
Thus, a "policymaker" is one who is "responsible for establishing final government policy respecting [a particular] activity." '30 5 In his statement of the holding of the case, Justice Brennan elaborated on both the policy and policymaker
aspects of official policy by concluding that "municipal liability under § 1983
attaches where-and only where-a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in
30 6
question."
Although it has helped to clarify the meaning of official policy and policymaker, the Court's decision in Pembaur also has accentuated the distortion
inherent in the municipal liability picture created by the policy or custom requirement. The Court's focus on the status of the decisionmaker as the determining factor in deciding whether official policy has been made highlights the
difficulty of not accepting respondeat superioras the theory of recovery in a section 1983 municipal liability case. Although Justice Brennan attempted to distinguish between acts of the municipality for which it should be responsible and
acts of employees of the municipality for which it should not be responsible, his
approach implicitly recognized that municipalities can act only through their
employees. This approach effectively limits municipal liability to responsibility
for acts of a certain category of municipal employee-those high level employees
who have final decisionmaking authority. In essence, it thus imposes municipal
liability based on respondeat superior for the acts of some employees but not
also, Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary 1392 (2d ed. 1979) ("any governing
principle, plan, or course of action"); Random House Dictionary 1113 (1966) ("a course of
action adopted and pursued by a government, ruler, political party, etc.").
Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1299 n.39.
Thus, in the "battle of the dictionaries," the Pembaur Court's flexible approach to "policy"
appears to come out ahead of the Tuttle Court's more rigid approach if number of sources is any
criterion for judgment.
302. Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1299.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1299-1300.
306. Id. at 1300. This holding could be read to exclude the concept of custom as a possible basis
for recovery in a § 1983 case. However, the majority makes clear that custom is a basis for recovery
but that it was not in issue in the case. Id. at 1299 n.10.
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others. 30 7 The municipality is deemed responsible for the acts of high level decisionmaking employees but not for the acts of low level, frontline employees.
This distinction based on the particular status of the employee is especially unacceptable. It is the low level employee who has the greatest exposure to the public and, therefore, the greatest potential for committing constitutional
violations. 308 Furthermore, the Pembaur approach may present difficult
problems of proof. In one sense, the approach eases the plaintiff's burden because a single decision may constitute policy. However, the plaintiffs in such
cases must establish that the decisionmaker had policy-making status.
Another problem with the Pembaurdecision is that the approach taken by
the majority and the result reached seem inconsistent with the approach and
result in Tuttle. In Tuttle the plurality focused on fault as the basis of liability
and concluded that a single act of misconduct without more is insufficient to
establish a policy of inadequate training or supervision. In Pembaurthe majority focused on causation as the basis of liability and concluded that a single
decision by an authorized policymaker is sufficient to constitute official policy
and can form the basis for recovery under section 1983. It is difficult to explain
the different approaches taken in the two seemingly similar cases. One obvious
difference between the two decisions exists: Tuttle is a classic police misconduct
case in which the section 1983 municipal liability claim is based on a policy of
inadequate training or supervision; Pembaur, by contrast, is a policy case in
which the government actor carried out official policy proclaimed by an authorized policymaker. Another distinction between the cases is that the policy causing the constitutional violation in Pembaur was in itself unconstitutional; the
policy in Tuttle was not in itself unconstitutional, but rather resulted in unconstitutional conduct. The question is whether these distinctions justify the different approaches.
Assuming the legitimacy of the policy or custom requirement, 30 9 the factual distinctions between the two cases appear to justify a distinction based on
the single incident aspect. A single incident of police misconduct could easily
occur even if no policy or custom of inadequate training or supervision existed.
Misbehavior could result from any number of things. Therefore, additional
proof of the policy independent of the incident giving rise to the suit should be
required. On the other hand, if official policy is simply the decision of a decisionmaker who has the final authority with respect to a particular issue, there is
no reason a single decision by such a person that creates policy resulting in
307. The dissenters in Pembaur noted and disagreed with the majority's focus on the status of
the decision-maker as the basis for determining that an official policy caused plaintiff's harm. Their
criticism was that this approach results in circular reasoning because "policy is what policymakers
make, and policymakers are those who have authority to make policy." Id. at 1308 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). However, far from advocating a respondeat superior approach, the dissenters would
require a focus on the question of whether official policy had been formed by looking to the nature of
the decision and the process by which it was reached, in order to distinguish between actual policies
and ad hoc decisions. Id. at 1308-09 (Powell, J., dissenting).
308. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
309. Obviously, the illegitimacy of the policy or custom requirement is a major focus of this
Article. However, because the policy or custom requirement is the approach to municipal liability
the Court has chosen, it is necessary to understand how it functions in particular cases.
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constitutional deprivation should not be the basis of section 1983 municipal
liability.
The more difficult question is why the Court focused on the concepts of
fault and causation in Tuttle and only on the concept of causation in Pembaur.
Possibly the Court focused on fault in Tuttle because the official policy challenged was not in itself unconstitutional and did not focus on fault in Pembaur
because the official policy was in itself unconstitutional. If this distinction is
operative, then when the policy itself is unconstitutional, the plaintiff need only
prove that the policy in fact caused an invasion of his or her civil rights. On the
other hand, if the policy is not unconstitutional, the plaintiff must establish in
addition to causation that the municipality was at fault for allowing a policy to
exist that has the potential for causing constitutional injury. However, although
the Court in Tuttle indicated that a distinction may exist between unconstitutional policies and those not in themselves unconstitutional, it focused on the
quantum of proof necessary to prove the latter. It did not focus on the need to
establish fault in the case of a policy not in itself unconstitutional. 3 10 In fact, the
Tuttle plurality decision suggested that fault is a requirement regardless of
whether the policy is constitutional or unconstitutional. 31' The Pembaurmajority, on the other hand, never mentioned fault and drew no distinctions between
its approach to policy and the approach taken in Tuttle. 312 Its focus was exclusively on the causation aspects of the policy or custom requirement.
It is not clear that the Court's focus on fault in Tuttle is based on a distinction between policies that are in themselves unconstitutional and policies that
are not in themselves unconstitutional. However, this reason does not justify the
difference in approach. Municipal policies or customs of inadequate training or
supervision create significant risks that constitutional rights will be invaded even
if the policy or custom is not unconstitutional. To impose on the plaintiff an
additional fault requirement is contrary to the intent of the drafters of the statute, who required only proof of a constitutional deprivation perpetrated under
color of state law. Proof that the training or supervision is inadequate and that
the inadequately trained or supervised municipal employee caused a constitutional violation should be sufficient. The fault requirement would place an additional and unintended burden on the plaintiff.
In the four section 1983 municipal liability cases it has decided since Monell, the Supreme Court has attempted to add to and clarify the sketch of munic310. The Tuttle Court concluded that if the policy is not in itself unconstitutional, a single incident cannot suffice to establish fault. Specifically, the Court stated that "where the policy relied
upon is not itself unconstitutional, considerablymore proof than a single incident will be necessary in
every case to establish both the requisite fault on the part of the municipality, and the causal connection between the 'policy' and the constitutional deprivation." Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824 (emphasis
added). Thus, although the Court included the notion of fault, the focus is on the amount of proof
necessary to establish fault.
311. The Tuttle plurality's constant references to fault and its focus on the amount of proof
necessary to establish "the requisitefault on the part of the municipality" lead to this conclusion. Id.
at 824 (emphasis added).
312. In a footnote in the majority opinion the Pembaur Court specifically found that its approach to policy was not inconsistent with the approach taken in Tuttle. Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at
1299 n.ll.
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ipal liability drawn in Monell. However, the Court's line-drawing efforts have
raised more questions than they have settled. The responsibility for the resulting
confusion lies with the Monell policy or custom requirement. The Court's inability to present a clear picture of section 1983 municipal liability is directly
attributable to the Court's error in perspective caused by the policy or custom
requirement.
V.

CONCLUSION

Congress enacted section 1983 over a century ago to provide broad remedies to anyone whose civil rights are violated by "persons" acting under color of
state law. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute in Monell to include municipalities within the meaning of the word "person" expanded the potential for protection against abuses of governmental power. Unfortunately,
however, the Court's rejection of respondeat superior in favor of the policy or
custom requirement has impeded the development of the sketch of municipal
liability into a picture that reflects the vision of freedom intended by the fortysecond Congress. The Monell policy or custom requirement has limited the
scope of protection and added extraneous considerations that have blurred the
image of governmental responsibility for unconstitutional behavior of those acting on behalf of the government.
It might be argued that at least a municipal liability dimension adheres to
the section 1983 action whereas none existed prior to Monell. However, the
municipal liability aspect is developing in a manner that may be detrimental to
the long range future of section 1983 civil rights protection generally. The inclination of the Supreme Court to interpret the policy or custom requirement to
include a fault element could color its approach to the requirements of the section 1983 prima facie case in situations other than municipal liability.
At the very least, as an alternative to re-creating the basis of liability in
section 1983 municipal liability cases, the Court could alleviate the problem
somewhat by attempting to clarify the policy or custom requirement. Too many
features of it are as yet unresolved 31 3 and those aspects the Court has had occasion to address remain obscure. Consistency in approach and result would
greatly benefit lower courts attempting to apply the Court's picture of section
1983 municipal liability. In particular, the Court should take its earliest opportunity to explain its references to fault in Tuttle. Unless the Court addresses this
issue directly, lower courts are likely to render decisions under the misapprehension that fault is a necessary element of the section 1983 municipal liability case.
The only certain way the Court could correct the distortion created by the
policy or custom requirement would be to reconsider the basis of liability issue
in section 1983 municipal liability. A careful reexamination of the legislative
history, the language of the statute, the background of tort liability, and the
policies at stake would demonstrate to the Court that its rejection of respondeat
313. For instance, the Court has not yet had occasion to explore the meaning or contours of
"custom" in the § 1983 municipal liability setting.
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superior in Monell was unwarranted. 3 14 Above all, when addressing a section
1983 municipal liability question, the Supreme Court should recognize that its
function is to use the tools Congress provided in section 1983 for the purpose
Congress created them-to represent the picture of personal liberty the fortysecond Congress envisioned. The more care the Court takes in discerning and
then illustrating the expansive intent of Congress, the greater the likelihood that
a clear picture of section 1983 municipal liability will emerge.

314. At this point, however, it is unrealistic to expect that such reconsideration will occur. Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist in his plurality opinion in Tuttle has made clear that reconsideration is extremely unlikely. See Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 818 n.5. Currently, Justice Stevens is the lone
voice on the Court favoring respondeatsuperioras the basis of § 1983 municipal liability. See id. at
834-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1303 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).

